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1. Introduction 
The present overview covers the period starting from 2000 until the end of 2005. 1 This is the 
follow-up to our overview covering the 1995-1999 period.2 The first striking feature of the 
present contribution is that it has to deal with almost 3,5 times as many cases as the previous 
one. Hence, the ECJ has gone from deciding 40 cases in the five year period between 1995-
1999 to deciding over 140 cases based on Art 49 between 2000-2005.  This confirms, beyond 
any doubt, the tendency already observed in our previous overview, that a “third generation” 
case law on services is being developed at a very rapid pace by the ECJ. This third 
generation case law is based on the idea that Article 49 EC is not limited to striking down 
discriminatory measures but extends to the elimination of all hindrances to the free provision 
of services. This idea was first expressed in the Tourist Guide cases, the Greek and Dutch TV 
cases and most importantly in the Säger case.3 It has been confirmed ever since. As was to 
be expected, this broad brush approach of the Court’s has led to an ever-increasing amount 
of litigation reaching Luxemburg. It is clear that, if indicators were used to weight the 
importance of the Court’s case law during the relevant period, services would score much 
higher than goods, both from a quantitative and from a qualitative perspective.4  
Hence, contrary to the previous overview, this one cannot deal in detail with any of the  
judgments delivered during the reference period. The aim of the present contribution is 
restricted to presenting the basic trends of the Court’s case law in the field of services. 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor at the Democritus University of Thrace (Greece), Visiting Professor at the College of 
Europe, Bruges (Belgium), Jean Monnet Fellow at the University of Michigan (USA). The author wishes to 
express his gratitude to the Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation for providing him with the means to 
pursue the research necessary for the completion of the present article. vasshatz@socadm.duth.gr  
** Teaching Assistant at the College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium). tdo@coleurop.be  
1 For reasons of commodity the reference period stops at the end of 2005. Judgments delivered in the course 
of 2006 are briefly presented only to the extent that they constitute the immediate follow-up to decisions 
delivered during the relevant period. 
2 Hatzopoulos, “Recent developments of the case law of the ECJ in the field of free of services 1994-1999”, 
CML Rev. (2000), 43-82. 
3 Cases C-154/89, C-180/89 and C-189/89, respectively Commission v. France, Italy and Greece, [1991] ECR 
I-659; Case C-260/89, ERT, [1991] ECR I-2925; Case C-288/89, Gouda, [1991] ECR I-4007; and Case C-
353/89, Commission v. The Netherlands, Mediawet, [1991] ECR I-4069; Case C-76/90, Säger, [1991] 
ECR I-4221. 
4 It is true that the Court’s simple search engine (http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en) only lists 81 
cases as being decided under the provisions on the free movement of services during the relevant period, 
while it lists 88 cases under the field of free movement of goods. This, however, does not account for a) 
cases mainly decided under some other fundamental freedoms but containing important services points 
and b) services cases in the fields of transport, energy, social security or taxation (which constitute 
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Therefore, the analysis follows a fundamentally horizontal approach, fleetingly considering the 
facts of individual cases, with a view to identifying the conceptual premises of the Court’s 
approach to the free movement of services. Nonetheless, the substantial solutions adopted by 
the Court in some key topics, such as concession contracts, healthcare services, posted 
workers and gambling, are also presented as case studies. In this regard, the analysis is 
organized in four sections. First we explore the (ever expanding) scope of the freedom to 
provide services (Section 2), then we go on to identify the nature of the violations and of 
justifications thereto (Section 3), before carrying out some case studies to concretely illustrate 
the above (Section 4). Then, for the sake of completeness, we try to deduce the general 
principles running through the totality of the relevant case law (Section 5). Inevitably, some 
concluding remarks follow (Section 6).5 
 
2. Scope of the freedom 
2.1. The concept of service 
Building on its previous case law, the Court further extends the concept of services. In this 
respect, all three trends of the Court’s case law were already present during the 1995-1999 
period.6 However, some of the more recent cases have had a very important impact on the 
design of the common market and on relevant Member States policies. 
2.1.1. Virtual – Future services 
When the Court decided, in Alpine Investments,7 that the mere existence of virtual cross 
border recipients of services, was enough for Article 49 to apply, many writers were 
dismayed.8 However, seven years later, in the Carpenter case,9 this was only a preliminary 
point in a much more controversial judgment. In this case the Filipino wife of a British national 
had failed to renew her residence visa and was facing expulsion from the UK. In a reference 
from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the Court, flying in the face of the Commission’s 
submissions, held that this was not a purely internal situation. The Court held that Mr. 
Carpenter, whose profession entailed “selling advertising space in medical and scientific 
journals and offering various administrative and publishing services to the editors of those 
                                                                                                                                                                      
separate categories in the Court’s search engine). From a qualitative point of view, it is under Article 49 
that the breakthrough judgments in the field of health, posted workers and citizenship have been delivered. 
5 Therefore, although almost all of the important cases are being discussed, or at least mentioned, in the 
present contribution, this in no way accounts for an exhaustive presentation of the totality of the service 
cases judged by the Court during the relevant period. 
6 See Hatzopoulos, n. 1 above, especially paras 2.1 and 2.4. 
7 Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, [1995] ECR I-1141, annotated by Hatzopoulos in CML Rev. (1995), 
1427-1445. 
8 Coppenhole and Devroe, (1995) JTDC, 13; also Devroe and Wouters, (1996) JTDC, 60. See however our 
annotation in this Review for a refutation of the critical position expressed by these authors. 
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journals” was a service provider in the Art 49 EC sense of the term, since many of his clients 
were established in other Member States. The Court was satisfied that this was so, without 
identifying any specific cross-border service actually provided by Mr. Carpenter.  Moreover, 
the Court found that the bulk of Mr. Carpenter’s services were provided to his overseas clients 
without him having to move there, since only the services themselves crossed the borders. 
Quoting its judgment in Alpine Investments, the Court held that this situation fell within the 
scope of Article 49 EC. The reasoning of the Court following this preliminary finding proved 
even more controversial..10 This preliminary finding of the Court seems to confirm that the 
existence of virtual service recipients in other Member States is enough for Article 49 EC to 
come into play. However, it has been stressed that virtual is distinct from hypothetical.11 From 
the factual situations prevailing in Alpine Investments and Carpenter, it seems that the Court 
pays attention to the business-plan and structure of the service provider, as well as to the 
nature of the services provided. If these indicate that there is a) intention and b) material 
possibility to provide services to recipients in other Member States, then the Court will readily 
apply Article 49 EC. However, specific services or service recipients need not be identified.  
This point was taken further in Omega.12 This case concerned the prohibition imposed by the 
German authorities on Omega, a German undertaking, precluding it from operating a “play to 
kill” game, on the grounds that it was contrary to human dignity. The referring Court 
acknowledged that such a prohibition could frustrate the leasing contracts for machinery, that 
Omega had concluded with an undertaking established in the UK, thus limiting its freedom to 
receive services (and possibly goods). One of the admissibility objections raised by the 
German authorities was that at the date of the adoption of the contested measure, no contract 
had been concluded between the parties, and thus no service relation could be identified. The 
Court however, rejected this argument, holding that the contested “order is capable of 
restricting the future development of contractual relations between the two parties” and went 
on to examine the applicability of Article 49 EC. Therefore, not only virtual but also future 
services fall into the ambit of Article 49 EC, provided that, in view of the specific facts of each 
case, they are likely to materialize.  
On the other hand, purely hypothetical services do not qualify under Article 49 EC. This was 
made clear in Oulane.13 A French national, who had been located in the Netherlands without 
any form of identification, was detained and later deported to France. He sued the Dutch 
authorities in damages for improper detention, arguing that he was a tourist, and thus a 
service recipient under the Luisi & Carbone and Cowan case law.14 The referring Court asked 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Case C-60/00, Carpenter, [2002] ECR I-6279. 
10 See 5.2.2. below. 
11 See our annotation of Alpine Investments, n. 7 above, especially the text which accompanies n. 25. 
12 Case C-36/02, Omega, [2004] ECR I-9609. See also the annotation by Ackermann, CML Rev. (2005), 
1107-1120. 
13 Case C-215/03, Oulane, [2005] ECR I-1215. 
14 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83, Luisi and Carbone, [1984] ECR 377, para 16; see also Case 186/87, 
Cowan, [1989] ECR 195, para 15. 
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whether “a national of a Member State may be assumed to be a recipient of tourist services in 
another Member State solely by virtue of his staying in that Member State for a period of over 
six months, even where he is unable to give a fixed abode or residence and has no money or 
luggage” (para. 45). The Court replied that it is for the person invoking the status of service 
recipient to prove such a status. This case clearly marks the distinction between, on the one 
hand, a future or virtual service recipient (such as Omega) and on the other hand, a 
hypothetical or bogus service recipient (such as Mr. Oulane). It also shows that the Court will 
not extend ad infinitum the scope of application of Article 49 EC.15 
2.1.2. A conceptual shift: bringing in line the economic and legal 
concepts of “services”  
According to the black letter of Article 49 EC, it is supposed to apply to situations where no 
other Treaty freedom applies; it has a subordinate character. In this respect, services (Article 
49) were traditionally distinguished from establishment (Article 43) by virtue of their temporary 
nature. Hence, in the German insurance case,16 the Court held that as soon as the service 
provider acquired some stable infrastructure in the host State, the Treaty provisions on 
establishment became applicable. This position was later reviewed in Gebhard,17 where the 
Court recognized that a provider of services within the meaning of Article 49 EC could make 
use of some permanent infrastructure in the host State. Nevertheless, the Court insisted on 
the temporal character of the provision of services. It stated that “not only the duration of the 
provision of the service, but also its regularity, periodicity or continuity”18 may bring it under 
the rules on establishment. This made commentators conclude that service provision must be 
of an “episodic” or “irregular” nature.19  
In its most recent case low, however, the Court seems to be abandoning the temporal 
criterion in favour of a more economic one. Indeed, the Court seems ready to treat economic 
activities which qualify as services under Article 49 EC, irrespective of their duration. The first 
clear move in this direction occurred in the Schnitzer judgment.20 Mr. Schnitzer, a German 
national, was pursued in Germany for having employed a Portuguese construction company 
for three years, without it being registered in conformity with the German legislation. The first 
question asked to the Court was whether the Portuguese company should be deemed to be 
established, in the sense of Art 43 EC, or on the contrary, if it were merely providing services 
in Germany. If the former were true, then the company should abide by all the regulations of 
the host Member State. If the latter qualification applied, then according to well-established 
                                                          
15 The same trend is also to be observed in some other recent cases of the Court, for which see below 3.1. 
16 Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany, Insurance, [1986] ECR 3755. 
17 Case C-55/94, Gebhard, [1995] ECR I-4165. 
18 Para 27 of the judgment. 
19 See Hatzopoulos, n. 1 above, 45, where this restrictive approach of the Court was also criticized as being 
inappropriate in view of the current development and sophistication of services. 
20 Case C-215/01, Schnitzer, [2003] ECR I-14847. 
 6
case law,21 the service provider could not be expected to fulfil all the requirements of the host 
State - especially not registration requirements, unless such a requirement were justified by 
an overriding reason of general interest.22 In order to reply to the question asked, the Court 
referred to the same criteria as in Gebhard, i.e. the duration, the regularity, the periodical 
nature and the continuity of the service, but reached the a diametrically opposed conclusion. 
The Court found that the above characteristics were not enough to make  service provision 
fall within the scope of Article 43 EC: “services” within the meaning of the Treaty may cover 
services varying widely in nature, including services which are provided over an extended 
period, even over several years […]. Services within the meaning of the Treaty may likewise 
be constituted by services which a business established in a Member State supplies with a 
greater or lesser degree of frequency or regularity, even over an extended period, to persons 
established in one or more other Member States”.23  
This is an important statement where the Court, explicitly for the first time,24 seems to be 
favoring an economic approach over a legalistic one, thus abandoning the artificial distinction 
between services and establishment. Such a trend could already be identified in some earlier 
cases concerning “naturally” trans-border services,25 such as TV broadcasting, 
telecommunications or transport,26 where the Court applied Article 49 EC without taking into 
account any temporal consideration. However, the present case, not only makes it clear that it 
is the economic nature – and not the duration – of the activity that constitutes the main 
criterion for its legal classification, it also creates a presumption in favor of the application of 
Article 49 in all service situations. The Court finds that an a priori registration requirement of 
service providers may not be justified because “at the moment when a provider of services 
envisages supplying services in the host Member State and examination of the conditions 
governing access to the activities concerned is carried out, it is often difficult to say whether 
those services are going to be supplied just once or very occasionally or whether, on the 
other hand, they will be supplied in a repeated or more or less regular manner”.27 In other 
words, the Court states that the nature of the activity is readily ascertainable and can safely 
lead to legal qualifications, while its duration, periodicity, etc., are not.28  
                                                          
21 The Tourist Guide cases, n. 3 above. 
22 See 5.1.1, below. 
23 Schnitzer, n. 20 above, para 30. 
24 The seeds for this finding had been shown in case C-131/01, Commission v. Italy, Patent Agents, [2003] 
ECR I-1659, where the Court held that, although the submission and follow-up of patent applications and 
the protection of patents awarded did entail a series of actions spread over a long period of time, this did 
not mean that the activity in question necessarily entail a stable and continuous participation in the 
economic life of the host State. 
25 For which see 2.2.1.2. below. 
26 Case C-17/00, De Coster, [2001] ECR I-9445; Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03, Mobistar and 
Belgacom, judgment of 8 September 2005, nyr.; and Case C-92/01, Stylianakis, [2003] ECR I-1291, 
respectively. 
27 Schnitzer, n. 20, para 39. 
28 It is worth noting that the proposal for the services Directive, as submitted by the Commission to the EP for 
second reading [COM (2006) 160 of 4 April 2006], follows broadly the same logic, since in recital 4 it 
considers that “it is necessary to enable service providers to develop their service activities with the 
internal market either by becoming established in a Member State or by making use of the free movement 
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In this way, the concept of service under the EC Treaty is brought into line with that under the 
WTO agreement and the GATS. Moreover, logic and coherence are introduced in the way 
that EC Treaty provisions apply, since the legal category of services is prima facie made to 
coincide with the economic one. Instituted at a time when service activities represented an 
insignificant part of the economic activity of Member States, the traditional analysis according 
to which services constitute a residual category could no longer hold true. Henceforth, the 
rules on establishment which exist under the EC Treaty (in contrast to the GATS, where no 
such rules exist), ought to apply only in those cases where the service provider genuinely and 
permanently moves to another Member State. This should be ascertained, according to the 
Court, by reference to two criteria: a) a material criterion, whereby the infrastructure set up by 
the service provider goes beyond what is strictly necessary for the temporal provision of 
specific services and b) an intentional criterion, whereby the service provider “holds himself 
out to, amongst others, nationals of the second Member State”29 and intends to acquire and 
occupy a market share in this State.  
The (r)evolution of the concept of services catalysed by the judgment in Schnitzer, largely 
unnoticed by the doctrine,30 was confirmed by the Court, some months later, in a case against 
Portugal concerning private security firms.31 The Portuguese legislation at stake only 
concerned undertakings offering private security services within Portugal for longer than a 
calendar year.32 The question arose whether the said legislation could be judged by reference 
to Article 49 EC. The Court repeated its findings in Schnitzer and further widened the scope of 
application of the rules on services. For the Court held that “all services that are not offered 
on a stable and continuous basis from an established professional base in the Member State 
of destination constitute provision of services within the meaning of Article 49 EC”33. This 
being said the Court further emphasized that “no provision of the Treaty affords a means of 
determining, in an abstract manner, the duration or frequency beyond which the supply of a 
service or of a certain type of service in another Member State can no longer be regarded as 
the provision of services within the meaning of the Treaty”.34 The negative formulation used by 
the Court together with the casuistic approach put forward considerably widens the scope of 
application of Article 49 EC, while it does away, once and for all, with the myth of services 
being a subsidiary category.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
of services”. Thereafter, the directive contains (distinct) rules for the provision of services, both by 
undertakings established and by undertakings occasionally acting within the territory of another Member 
State (Chapters IIa and III, respectively). 
29 Schnitzer, n. 20 above, para 32. 
30 Some authors have observed the newness of the Court’s approach but have hesitated to identify a fully new 
direction, see e.g. Prieto, “Liberté d’établissement et de prestation de services”, (2004) RTDE, 543 speaks 
of the temporal criterion as being “dilaté” in this case. 
31 Case C-171/02, Commission v. Portugal, Private Security Firms, [2004] I-5645. Further for this case see 
2.1.2. and 5.1.2. below. 
32 The Court had already accepted that a period of a calendar year did not counter the application of the rules 
on the free provision of services in Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, Arblade and Leloup, [1999] 
ECR I-8453. 
33 Id., para 25 in fine, emphasis added. 
34 Ibid., para 26. 
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2.1.3. Bringing “excluded” services under Article 49 EC 
The period under consideration will be remembered as one where the Court 
greatly extended the scope of application of Article 49 to fields which were 
hitherto excluded.  
2.1.3.1. Transport services 
As early as 1994 the Court had held that, after the adoption by the Council of 
the specific Regulations provided for by Article 71 EC, transport services 
should comply fully with the requirements of Article 49. Hence, Regulation 
4055/8635 was held by the Court to fully transpose the free movement 
principles to maritime transport.36 It is, therefore, striking that during the period 
under consideration, the Court had to deal with no less than six cases 
involving four Member States, where the interconnection between Article 49 
EC and the sector specific rules had to be spelled out. On this occasion, the 
Court did not hesitate to “cross-fertilize” in these spheres the former from the 
latter and vice versa.  
In Commission v. Italy, embarkation tax37 the Italian republic was condemned, 
under both Regulation 4055/86 and Article 49, for applying differential taxes to 
passengers travelling between domestic ports, and those travelling to a non 
Italian destination. Similarly, in Sea Land,38 the Dutch measure which imposed 
higher taxes on owners of vessels longer than 41 m was found to be indirectly 
discriminatory since bigger vessels were more likely to undertake trips to/from 
non domestic destinations. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court 
accepted that, in a similar vein to Article 49 EC, the Regulation provisions 
could be invoked by an undertaking against its own state of origin.39 More 
interesting yet is the finding of the Court in Geha.40 This case concerned 
Greek legislation which imposed higher taxes to vessels voyaging to Turkey 
                                                          
35 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4055/86 of 22 December 1986, applying the principle of freedom to provide 
services to maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third countries, 
(1986) OJ L 378, p. 1. 
36 Case C-381/93, Commission v. France, [1994] ECR I-5145. 
37 Case 295/00, Commission v. Italy, Embarkation Tax, [2002] ECR I-1737. 
38 Case C-430/99, Sea-Land, [2002] ECR I-5235. 
39 The same conclusion had already been reached in Commission v. France, n. 36 above. 
40 Case C-435/00, Geha Naftiliaki, [2002] ECR I-10615. 
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than to those going to the Greek islands. The Court found that the free 
movement principles stemming from the Treaty should have the scope of 
territorial application provided for by the Regulation. Hence, the Court 
combined the material rule of Article 49 EC (prohibition of any measure 
rendering more difficult the provision of services between Member States) 
with the territorial scope of the Regulation (covering traffic between Member 
States and third countries) with the effect of applying Art 49 to a situation 
where no trade between Member States was at stake. 
Similarly, the Court has condemned discriminatory national taxes on air 
transport. In Commision v. Portugal, airport taxes41 the Court found that 
Regulation 2408/9242 fully transposed the free movement of services “acquis” 
in the field of air transport. Therefore, any national measure which specifically 
burdens air transport services across Member States is contrary to Article 49 
EC. Similarly, Italian legislation which imposed a higher tax on passengers 
travelling to non domestic destinations was found to constitute a violation of 
the free movement of services rules.43 Likewise, the “subtle” Greek measure 
which imposed a higher tax on passengers travelling over 750 km (with all 
domestic flights but one being subject to the lower tax) was also found 
incompatible with Article 49 EC.44 
2.1.3.2. Procurement – concession contracts 
More striking is the case-law of the Court concerning public procurement. In this field we can 
distinguish two parallel trends. First, the Court simultaneously applies Article 49 EC and the 
sector specific Directives in order to complete possible lacunae contained in the latter. 
Second, in the absence of any specific text of secondary legislation, the Court applies the 
general principles stemming from Article 49 EC (and the public procurement Directives) to 
concession contracts. 
The first tendency is illustrated by reference to case Commission v. France, Nord Pas de 
Calais.45 The French local authorities were pursued, among other reasons, because in several 
tender documents and contract notices for the award of public works, reference was made 
                                                          
41 Case C-70/99, Commission v. Portugal, Airport Taxes, [2001] ECR I-4845. 
42 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-
Community air routes, (1992) OJ  L 15, p.33. 
43 Case C-447/99, Commission v. Italy, Air Departure Tax, [2001] ECR I-5203. 
44 Case C-92/01, Stylianakis, [2003] ECR I-1291. 
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only to the technical classifications of French professional organizations. The notices in 
question did not exclude certificates issued by other Member States and thus did not violate 
any specific rule of the relevant public work Directives. Notwithstanding this fact, the Court 
accepted the Commission’s argument and held that “to the extent that the designation of the 
lots by reference to classifications of French professional organisations is likely to have a 
dissuasive effect on tenderers who are not French, it thereby constitutes indirect 
discrimination and, therefore, a restriction on the freedom to provide services, within the 
meaning of Article 59 of the Treaty” .46 The Court did not elaborate upon its finding, but made 
clear that the general principles governing Article 49 also apply in the field of public 
procurement. This is an interesting finding in at least two respects. First, the existence of 
highly technical and detailed rules of secondary legislation in the field of procurement could 
be thought to make recourse to the general Treaty provisions redundant; this however does 
not hold true. Second, although practically it makes perfect sense, it is  unclear from a legal 
point of view how Article 49 on services may be used to complement a Directive on public 
works, adopted on the basis of Articles (now after amendment) 47, 55 and 95 EC. 
This judgment paved the way for the second and most important trend in the Court’s case-
law, namely the application of Article 49 EC to concession contracts. A series of three 
judgments, all delivered in 2005, illustrate this tendency.  In Coname47 an Italian municipality 
made a direct award of a contract for the service covering the maintenance, operation and 
monitoring of the methane gas network to a semi public undertaking. Coname, the previous 
supplier, complained about the lack of any competitive tendering procedure. Based on a reply 
by the referring tribunal, the Court took for granted this was a concession contract and found 
that none of the coordinating Directives (92/50, 93/38 or other) was applicable to it. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that the absence of transparency during the award procedure led 
to “a difference in treatment to the detriment of undertakings located in other Member States48 
and that such difference amounted to indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality, 
prohibited under Articles 43 EC and 49 EC”.49 In this way the Court established EC 
competence to monitor the way concession contracts are awarded, at a time when any 
relevant piece of secondary legislation was lacking.50 What is more, the Court implied that the 
application of Article 49 EC in this field should be inspired by the material rules of the 
Directives on public procurement. The Court held that the transparency requirement imposed 
upon the Italian municipality did not necessarily entail an obligation to hold an open tender 
with all the detailed publicity, time limitations and other restrictive conditions provided for by 
the Directives, but that equivalent guarantees should nonetheless be offered. This could 
                                                                                                                                                                      
45 Case C-225/98, Commission v. France, Nord Pas de Calais, [2000] ECR I-7445. 
46 Id. paras 81 and 83. 
47 Case C-231/03, Coname, [2005] ECR I-7287. 
48 Id. paras 17 and 18. 
49 Ibid. para 19. 
50 Now directive 2004/18/EC establishes clear rules about the concession of public works (Arts. 56 et seq.) 
while it explicitly excludes from its scope the concession of services (Art. 17). 
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qualify as an example of “reverse fertilization” whereby, instead of having the general Treaty 
rules inspiring the application of rules of secondary legislation, on the contrary, the more 
specific provisions of a Directive serve as a means for the application of the general Treaty 
rule. 
This trend was further pursued some months later in Parking Brixen,51 concerning the 
construction and management of a public swimming-pool. The Court found that “a complete 
lack of any call for competition in the case of the award of a public service concession does 
not comply with the requirements of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC any more than with the 
principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency”.52 In order to reach this 
conclusion, the Court explained that the above three principles, which constitute the 
cornerstones of public procurement law,53 are no more than specific expressions of the 
general principles enshrined in Articles 12, 43 and 49 of the Treaty. The end result, however, 
is again that the application of Articles 43 and 49 EC on public procurement is inspired by the 
sector-specific Directives. This further explains the finding that “the principle of equal 
treatment of tenderers is to be applied to public service concessions even in the absence of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality”,54 and even if no transnational element is present in 
the facts of the case (everything was German in the case decided by the Court) – a finding 
directly stemming from the Court’s case law on public procurement.55 Finally, the Court in this 
case, for the first time ever, provides a Community test concerning to the distinction between, 
on the one hand, public service contracts and, on the other, public service concessions: “the 
service provider’s remuneration comes not from the public authority concerned, but from 
sums paid by third parties for the use of the car park in question. That method of 
remuneration means that the provider takes the risk of operating the services”.56   
In Contse57, delivered some days later, the Court confirmed that the criterion for the distinction 
between service contracts and service concessions is the fact that in the latter the financial 
risk involved is mainly assumed by the participating undertaking.58 It further confirmed that 
concessions are governed by the general principles stemming from Articles 43 and 49 EC, in 
this specific case Article 49 EC.59 Thus, in the process for awarding a contract for the supply 
of home oxygen equipment, the Court found that clauses that a) made admissibility 
dependent upon the tenderer already having established offices in the province were the 
services were to be provided and b) made use of award criteria which privileged tenderers 
                                                          
51 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen, [2005] ECR I-8612. 
52 Id. para 48. 
53 See for example, Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO, Kluwer Law International (The Hague, 
2003), pp. 75. 
54 Parking Brixen, n. 51 above, para 48. 
55 See already Case C-243/89, Commission v. Danemark, Storbaelt, [1993] ECR I-3353. 
56 Id. para 40. 
57 Case 234/03, Contse, [2005] ECR I-9315. 
58 Id., para 22. 
59 Ibid. paras 23-25. 
 12
who already had established outlets open to the public in the contract area, had their 
production plant within an area of 1.000 km and had been offering the same service before, 
all violated Article 49 EC. 
2.1.3.3. Health and social security  
If the application of Article 49 EC to transport, public procurement and 
concession contracts can be qualified as an interesting development, then the 
extension of the scope of that same provision to embrace social security and 
health services is certainly to be seen as a revolution. It is true that the first 
indications of this revolution appeared already in the late nineties with the 
Kohl and Decker cases.60 It is, however, during the period under examination 
that the scope and extent of the interplay between the two sets of rules came 
to be identified. 
2.1.3.3.1. Social Security 
In Duphar61 in the field of goods, Poucet and Pistre62 in the field of services 
and constantly thereafter, the Court has held that “Community law does not 
detract from the powers of the Member States to organize their social security 
systems”. However, the Court has subsequently qualified this general 
statement. In a series of judgments concerning the applicability of the 
competition rules, the Court has gradually drawn a dividing line between funds 
(and other entities involved in social security and health care) which operate 
within the market and those which are outside (the market) and are governed 
by solidarity. The former should fully abide by the competition rules, subject to 
Article 86.2 etc, while the latter are exempted altogether from the application 
of the said rules.63 There is no hard and fast rule for the above distinction, 
rather the Court refers to a set of criteria. Elements which would point to a 
non-market entity, include: a) the social objective pursued, b) the compulsory 
                                                          
60 Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR Ι-1931 and Case C-120/95, Decker, [1998] ECR I-1831. 
61 Case 238/82, Duphar and Others v. Netherlands State, [1984] ECR 523, para 16. 
62 Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Poucet and Pistre, [1993] ECR I-637, para 6. 
63 See Case C-238/94, FFSA, [1995] ECR I-4013; Case C-70/905, Sodemare, [1997] ECR I-3395; Case C-
67/96, Albany, [1999] ECR I-5751; Joint Cases C-155/97 and C-157/97, Brentjens, [1999] ECR I-6025; 
and Case C-219/97, Drijvende, [1999] ECR I-6121, respectively. On these three cases, see Idot, “Droit 
Social et droit de la concurrence: confrontation ou cohabitation (A propos de quelques développements 
récents)”, (1999) Europe, chron. 11; Case C-218/00, Batistello, [2002] ECR I-691; Case T-319/99, FENIN 
v. Commission, [2003] ECR II-357; Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK 
Bundesverband, [2004] I-2493. 
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nature of the scheme, c) contributions paid being related to the income of the 
insured person, not to the nature of the risk covered, d) benefits accruing to 
insured persons not being directly linked to contributions paid by them, e) 
benefits and contributions being determined under the control or the 
supervision of the state, f) strong overall state control, g) the fact that funds 
collected are not capitalized and/or invested, but merely redistributed among 
participants in the scheme, i) cross-subsidization between different schemes 
and j) the nonexistence of competitive schemes offered by private operators.64 
It would be reasonable to assume that the same criteria also help determine 
the scope of application of Article 49 EC. Indeed, this has been confirmed, in 
Freskot.65 Greece had established a quasi-fiscal charge, levied on sales and 
purchases of domestic agricultural products, the revenue of which was used 
to fund a public body responsible for the prevention of, and compensation for, 
damage caused to agricultural holdings by natural disasters. The compatibility 
of such a measure was challenged inter alia under Article 49 EC. The Court 
used some of the criteria listed above (i.e. that the level, variation and other 
characteristics of the contribution paid by the Greek farmers, as well as the 
benefits accruing to them were determined by the government, independently 
from the contributions paid) and held Article 49 EC to be inapplicable, or, in 
the alternative, justifiably restricted. 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that in cases concerning the taxation 
of contributions paid to, and the benefits received from, insurance funds 
established in other Member States, the Court engaged into a fully fledged 
application of Article 49 EC. Danner66 concerned the Finnish legislation on the 
taxation of social security contributions. Mr Danner, both a German and a 
Finnish national, established himself in Finland. In the meanwhile he 
continued to pay contributions to two pension schemes in Germany, where he 
had previously worked. The Finnish tax authority refused to allow him to 
deduce from his income tax the amounts of contributions made to the German 
funds. The Court, after noting that Mr. Danner was no longer required to be 
                                                          
64 For a more detailed analysis of those criteria, see Hatzopoulos, “Health law and policy the impact of the EU” 
in De Burca (Ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity, EUI/OUP (2005), pp. 123-160. 
65 Case C-355/00, Freskot v. Elliniko Dimosio, [2003] ECR I-5263. 
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affiliated to the German funds,67 held that “the contributions paid by Mr Danner 
plainly constitute consideration for pensions which will be payable to him 
when he stops working and they unquestionably represent remuneration as 
regards the two German institutions which receive them”.68 Hence, with a 
single stroke of a pen, the Court did away with the social character of pension 
schemes and the idea of solidarity that they are supposed to embody, 
enshrined in the “pay as you go” principle. It transformed them, instead, into 
mere economic services offered for consideration. This seems to hold true at 
least in relation to voluntary or supplementary pension schemes (third pillar 
pensions).69 By the same token, the Court further stretched the concept of 
remuneration provided for by Article 49 EC, by loosening the temporal link 
between such remuneration and the service for which it is provided. 
The same logic prevailed some months later in Skandia.70 The factual situation 
was very similar to one in Danner with the difference that a triangular situation 
was at stake: the Danish undertaking which contributed to pension schemes 
in other Member States for its employees, was refused a tax deduction benefit 
for the premiums paid to such funds. The Court found that premiums paid by 
employers constituted consideration for the future pensions of the employees. 
A second, more fundamental difference, which the Court did not allude to, is 
that Skandia concerned a (second pillar) occupational scheme – not a 
voluntary, private one. It remains that first pillar compulsory pension schemes 
do not qualify as services under the Treaty.71 However, in order to control 
public expenditure, Member States will be forced to reduce public pension 
benefits and encourage their citizens to take out supplementary pensions in 
the market – that is the common market. In order to offer incentives to their 
citizens, Member States are likely to adopt the so called ET system 
(contributions Exempt, pensions payments Taxed), rather than the reverse TE 
                                                                                                                                                                      
66 Case C-136/00, Danner, [2002] ECR I-8147. 
67 Id., para 17. 
68 Ibid., para 27. 
69 See in this respect the excellent annotation of this case by Cordewener in CML Rev. (2003), 965-981, as 
well as de Brabanter, “The Danner case: elimination of Finnish tax obstacles to the cross-border 
contributions to voluntary pension schemes”, (2003) EC Tax Rev, 167-172. 
70 Case C-422/01, Skandia, [2003] ECR I-6817. Further for this case see 2.2.2. below. A similar factual 
situation was present in the earlier case C-302/98, Sehrer, [2000] ECR I-4585, concerning sickness 
insurance contributions, but it was dealt with under the rules on establishment. 
71 See Freskot. n. 65 above, and all the case law mentioned in ns. 60-63 above.  
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system.72 Whenever, the citizen of Member State A takes insurance with a 
company in Member State B, the exemption offered by the former State, will 
benefit the public purse of the latter, since the tax is withheld at the source of 
the revenue, that is by the tax authorities of the insurance company (Member 
State B).73 
Hence the Court, through the use of a technical, partly artificial and certainly 
flexible criterion, i.e. the existence of remuneration, extends the scope of 
application of the Treaty – and its own competence for negative integration – 
to fields which necessitate very technical and precise coordination – if at all. 
Only subsequently, at the justification stage, does the Court take into account  
reasons which may uphold national particularities, such as the fundamental 
choice between an ET or TE pension system. It may be that while the 
Member States are striving “softly” to coordinate their pension systems 
through the open method of coordination,74 the Court wants to give some 
stronger impulse, or, one could say, give the impulse for a shock therapy. 
2.1.3.3.2. Health 
Even more spectacular has been the development of the Court’s case law in relation to health 
services. The importance of the relevant judgments may be appreciated by the fact that all the 
(old) Member States have occasionally intervened in the proceedings before the Court in this 
field, essentially with positions opposed to the ones finally adopted by the Court. This case 
law, lengthy, highly technical and politically controversial, has been presented in detail by 
several authors.75 For the sake of completeness, the focal points of these decisions will be 
presented here below. 
                                                          
72 The ET system is also recommended by the European Commission, see Communication COM (2001) 214 
of 19 April 2001, (2001) OJ C 165/4. 
73 This oxymoron is very clearly explained by Cordewener, n. 69 above. 
74 On the general issue of the use of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the field of social policy 
(including pensions) see, among many, De la Porte and Pochet, “Social benchmarking, policy making and 
new governance in the EU”, (2001) JESP, 291-307; Wincott,  “Beyond social regulation? New instruments 
and/or a new agenda for social policy at Lisbon?”, (2003) Public Administration, 533-553; Trubek and 
Trubek, “Hard and soft law in the construction of social Europe: the role of the OMC”, (2005) ELJ, 343-
363; Zeitlin, “Social Europe and experimentalist governance: towards a new constitutional compromise?” 
in De Burca (Ed.), n. 64 above, pp. 213-241; see however on a more critical tone, concerning specifically 
pension reform, Featherstone, “Soft’ co-ordination meets ‘hard’ politics: the EU and pension reform in 
Greece”, (2005) JEPP, 733-750. 
75 See Hatzopoulos, “Killing national health and insurance systems but healing patients? The European 
market for health care services after the judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms”, CML Rev. 
(2002), 683-729, and more recently “Health law and policy, the impact of the EU”, n. 64 above. See also 
Davies, “Welfare as a service”, (2002) LIEI 27-40; Cabral, “The Internal Market and the right to cross-
border medical care”, (2004) ELRev, 673-685, and van der Mei, “Cross-border access to health care within 
the EU: Some reflections on Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and Vanbraekel”, (2002) ML, 289-215 and 
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With its judgments in Luisi & Carbone76 and Grogan,77 the Court acknowledged that health 
services are deemed to fall within the ambit of the economic ‘fundamental freedoms’ of the 
EC. However, the far reaching consequences of this finding did not become apparent until the 
judgment in Kohll.78  Mr. Kohll, a Luxembourg national, was seeking reimbursement for a 
dental treatment received (by his daughter) in Germany without having received prior 
authorization by his home institution. The Court, following Advocate General Tesauro, made it 
clear that Articles 49 et seq. EC apply to health services, even when they are provided in the 
context of a social security scheme. Indeed, as the Court put it: “the special nature of certain 
services does not remove them from the ambit of the fundamental principle of freedom of 
movement”.79 However, the judgment in Kohll left two crucial questions unanswered. Firstly, it 
concerned medical treatment offered by an independent dentist and thus left in doubt whether 
it extended to treatment offered within a hospital infrastructure. Secondly, the findings of the 
Court in Kohll were founded on a Social Healthcare system which operated on the basis of 
refunds; this begged the question of whether the judgment could also apply to a benefit-in-
kind system or, worse, to a purely National Health System (NHS) . Both questions were 
answered in the affirmative by the Vanbraekel80 and Peerbooms.81 judgments, which were 
delivered on the same day. These cases concerned patients affiliated to the Belgian and 
Dutch health system respectively, who had been hospitalized in other Member States. The 
Court found Article 49 EC to be fully applicable. Nevertheless, it took into consideration the 
Member States’ need to rationally organize its hospital services, as a ground for justifying the 
requirement that patients willing to receive hospital treatment abroad should obtain prior 
authorization. Furthermore some months later in Leichtle82, the Court made it clear that the 
term “hospital infrastructure” is to be understood restrictively.  This case concerned a German 
who received rehabilitation treatment in a thermal cure center in Italy. The Court, discarding 
the fact that such treatment necessitated organized facilities and set infrastructures, held 
Article 49 EC to be fully applicable and did not leave any room for a prior authorization 
requirement to be imposed. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“Cross-border access to medical care: Non-hospital care and waiting lists”, (2004) LIEI, 57-67. More 
recently see Dawes, “Bonjour Herr Doctor: national healthcare systems, the Internal Market and cross-
border medical care within the EU”, (2006) LIEI, 167-182. For a full account of the relationships between 
EU and Health Law see Hervey and McHale, Health Law and the European Union, CUP (Cambridge, 
2004). 
76 Luisi and Carbone, n. 14 above. 
77 Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, [1991] ECR I-4685, Rec. 18. 
78 Kohll, n. 60 above. For some comments of this case, see Mavridis in (1988) RMUE, 145-196; Van 
Raepenbusch in (1988) CDE, 683-697; and Huglo in (1988) RTDE, 584-589. 
79 Rec. 20 of the judgment. This passage of the judgment has been constantly cited by the Court in its more 
recent judgments; see the developments further down in this para. 
80 Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel, [2001] ECR I-5363. 
81 Case C-157/99, Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473. 
82 Case C-8/02, Leichtle, [2004] ECR I-2641. This case did not concern the expense of the treatment itself, but 
ancillary expenses such as board, lodging, travel and tax. In the more recent Case C-372/04, Watts, 
judgment of 6 May 2006, nyr., the Court made clear that such expenses are to be recovered by patients 
moving abroad only if they are taken into charge by the competent institutions for their patients when they 
are hospitalized within their own State of origin. 
 17
In all the above cases the Court interpreted Article 49 EC in order to circumscribe the 
discretion given to Member States by Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71, concerning the 
delivery of a prior authorization to patients wishing to obtain treatment abroad. In this respect, 
the Court held that for non-hospital treatment, patients can move to other Member States 
without applying for prior authorization, pay for the treatment received and then claim a refund 
from their home institution at the rates at which they would be covered had they not moved 
(and not at those actually paid in the other Member State). Further, in the cases where the 
patient did seek prior authorization, it a) should be delivered following a transparent and 
timely procedure, subject to judicial or quasi-judicial control, b) could not result to patients 
receiving less money from what they would have received had they stayed in their state of 
origin, c) could not be refused for specific treatment excluded according to purely national 
criteria and d) should always be given if the necessary treatment could not be offered in the 
Member State of affiliation within a reasonable time period, taking into consideration the 
specific situation of each patient. This last requirement was further qualified in Müller-Fauré83 
and more recently in Watts,84 which concerned the waiting lists practice in the UK NHS. 
Further, in Inizan85 the Court held that national funds may require their affiliates to obtain a 
prior authorization irrespective of whether they intend to receive hospital treatment in another 
Member State under regulation 1408/71 (and thus claim full refund according to the tariffs 
applicable in the host state) or under Article 49 EC (and only claim entitlement under national 
law). The latter could be delivered in cases where the conditions for the application of 
Regulation 1408/71 are not met. In Bosch86 the Court held that Member States may decide to 
do away altogether with the prior authorization requirement, thus ignoring the possibility 
offered by Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71. Finally, in Keller the Court held that a patient 
having the authorization to move from Member State A to Member State B, is entitled to 
recover expenses incurred in a third country, provided that he has been referred there by the 
doctors of Member State B.87 
On the second question left open by the judgment in Kohl, as to whether all the Member 
States’ health systems would fall within the ambit of Article 49 EC, irrespective of whether 
they operate on a refund, a benefits-in-kind basis or a NHS basis, the Court again replied in 
the affirmative. Kohl, Inizan and Bosch concerned national health insurance systems in 
Luxembourg, France and Germany, respectively, which offer refunds. On the other hand 
Smits & Peerbooms, Vanbraekel and Müller-Fauré all concerned patients affiliated to the 
Dutch health system which essentially offers benefits-in-kind. Finally, in Watts the Court 
                                                          
83 Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré, [2003] ECR I-4509. This case again concerned to patients affiliate to the 
Dutch health insurance system who were claiming a refund for (hospital and non-hospital) treatment 
received in other Member States, despite the fact that they had been refused the prior authorization to go 
there. 
84 Watts, n. 84 above. 
85 Case C-56/01, Inizan, [2003] ECR I-12403. 
86 Case C-193/03, Bosch, [2004] ECR I-9911. 
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applied the same principles to an elderly lady from Wales (where the purest form of public 
NHS, offering benefits in kind through public infrastructures, is operated), who had moved to 
France to receive treatment. In this case, again, the Court found that the specific patient was 
a service recipient to the extent that she had actually paid the price for the surgery she 
underwent. Presumably the same solution would be adopted by the Court in the (unlikely) 
situation where a patient from a benefits-in-kind (e.g. the Netherlands) or a refund (e.g. 
France) system moved to a pure NHS (e.g. the UK) and had to pay for treatment offered 
there.  
The requirement of prior authorization has also been upheld in relation to 
medical laboratories, in Commission v. France.88 Under French legislation 
health funds would reimburse payments for medical analyses carried out by 
appointed laboratories established on national territory. The Court found the 
establishment requirement unacceptable under Article 49 EC. It held, 
however, that laboratories from other Member States, wishing to offer 
services to French patients, could be required to comply with the French rules 
in order to obtain the authorisation required by the French authorities, subject 
to the proviso that “the conditions to be satisfied in order to obtain such 
authorisation may not duplicate the equivalent statutory conditions which have 
already been satisfied in the State of establishment”.89 The Court further held 
that, since it is impossible for the French authorities to carry out the necessary 
controls in the territories of other Member States, the burden of proof lies with 
the interested laboratories to show that they comply with the requirements 
imposed by the French legislation. Or, as the Court plainly put it: “[i]n the 
absence of harmonisation measures, Community law […] does not preclude 
the French Republic from imposing, in the context of an authorisation scheme, 
its level of public health protection on laboratories established in another 
Member State which wish to offer services to members of one of the French 
sickness insurance schemes”.90 This constitutes a clear departure from the 
finding of the Court in Alpine Investments, where it held that the restrictions 
stemming from the Dutch legislation, concerning the commercialization of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
87 Case C-145/03, Keller, [2005] ECR I-2529. In this case the patient had the authorization of Article 22 of 
Regulation 1408/71, but presumably (in view of the parallelism established by the Court in Inizan and 
Watts) the same solution would apply if she had the authorization which may be given under Article 49 EC. 
88 Case C-496/01, Commission v. France, Medical Laboratories, [2004] I-2351. 
89 Id., para 71. 
90 Ibid., para 93. 
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financial services, could not be exported to other Member States. It is beyond 
doubt that the obligation to comply with the French legislation constitutes a 
restriction to, for instance, a laboratory established in Germany. However, 
such a restriction is justified by the protection of public health.  Hence, the 
judgment in Commission v. France, which went unnoticed by the doctrine, 
gives Member States a clear means of restricting, or at least rationalizing, 
“exodus” from the national welfare system towards other Member States’ 
facilities, through the use of a prior authorization procedure, based on 
objective qualitative criteria and respectful of the principle of mutual 
recognition. 
The highly technical and politically sensitive issues raised by health care 
services explain the fact that Article 23 of the draft proposal for the “services” 
Directive, which consolidated the above case law into secondary legislation, 
has been dropped after the first reading of the EP. This, however, may not 
necessarily be seen as a negative development in view of the specificity of the 
subject matter and of the fact that the Court’s case law is still burgeoning in 
this field.91 
2.1.4. Measures not covered 
Despite adopting an all-inclusive concept of services and applying Article 49 
EC in an extensive manner, the Court, during the period under consideration 
also set some limits to the scope of the aforementioned provision.  
Hence, in Deliège92 the Court readily admitted that the participation in sport’s 
events, even on a non-professional basis, could entail the provision of 
services such as TV broadcasting, sponsorships, commercials, etc.93 This, 
however, did not have the effect of rendering Article 49 EC applicable to the 
selection rules according to which the Belgian judo federation chose the 
athletes who would participate in such events. The Court observed that 
                                                          
91 See Do, “La proposition de directive relative aux services dans le marché intérieur… définitivement hors 
service?”, (2006) RDUE, 111 et seq. 
92 Joined Cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Deliège, [2000] ECR I-2549. 
93 It is interesting to note that the Court satisfied itself with the simple possibility of some services being 
involved, without trying to identify any specific one. In this case this does not have any effect, since the 
Court declined to apply Art. 49 on different grounds. It may, however, be indicative of the Court’s large 
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“although selection rules […] inevitably have the effect of limiting the number 
of participants in a tournament; such a limitation is inherent in the conduct of 
an international high-level sports event, which necessarily involves certain 
selection rules or criteria being adopted”.94  
The Court of First Instance (CFI) had the occasion to elaborate further upon 
the limits of the applicability of the Treaty provisions on sports.  In Meca-
Medina,95 two long-distance swimming athletes where contesting the 
International Olympic Committee’s regulations against doping (and the EC 
Commission’s failure to act against them). The CFI held that the economic 
freedoms of the Treaty “do not affect purely sporting rules, that is to say rules 
concerning questions of purely sporting interest and, as such, having nothing 
to do with economic activity. In fact, such regulations, which relate to the 
particular nature and context of sporting events, are inherent in the 
organization and proper conduct of sporting competition and cannot be 
regarded as constituting a restriction on the Community rules on the freedom 
of movement of workers and the freedom to provide services”.96 The anti-
doping regulations adopted by a sports federation clearly fall within this 
category, unlike rules concerning the transfer of players or the composition of 
sports teams.97 
2.2. Conditions for the application of Article 49 EC 
2.2.1. The requirement of extraterritoriality 
2.2.1.1. General case law 
                                                                                                                                                                      
approach to the concept of services, for which see 2.1. above. It is also worth noting that the proposed 
“services” directive expressly excludes from its scope amateur sport, see Rec. 16a. 
94 Id., para 64. 
95 Case T-313/02, Meca-Medina v. Commission, judgment of 30 September 2004, nyr. 
96 Id., para 41. For a more recent case where the CFI refused to apply Art. 49 on rules concerning the 
organization of sport see Case T-193/02, Piau, judgment of 26 January 2005. 
97 Ibid., para 40, where the Court refers itself to Case C-415/93, Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921, Case C-176/96, 
Lehtonen, [2000] ECR I-2681 and Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund, [2003] ECR I-4135 
(concerning a player from an accession country), all cases decided under the freedom of establishment of 
workers. 
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The general rule according to which the Treaty provisions on free movement 
only apply to interstate situations has been under fire for over ten years now.98 
The first field in which the Court handed down a judgment in favour of the 
application of the Treaty rules to a wholly internal situation was the free 
movement of goods. Although the judgments in cases Lancry and Simitzi v. 
Kos99 could be seen as restricted to their specific facts, Pistre was clearly a 
judgment of principle, as it explicitly stated that “Article 30 cannot be 
considered inapplicable simply because all the facts of the specific case 
before the national Court are confined to a single Member State”.100 This 
general statement was subsequently qualified in Guimont.101 The very wording 
of Guimont was transposed two years later in Reisch,102 a case concerning the 
free movement of capitals. Finally, in relation to workers, the Court, indirectly 
in Surinder Singh103 and then, in a more direct way in Agnonese,104 has been 
ready to apply Articles 43 and 49 EC, respectively, to situations which only 
remotely presented some trans-national element.  
However, it is in the field of free movement of services, with its judgment in 
Carpenter, that the Court took the boldest step away from the need to 
establish a trans-border element as a precondition to the application of the 
Treaty rules. Mr. Carpenter is a British national whose Filipino wife was to be 
expelled from the UK for having failed to comply with the domestic 
immigration requirements. Therefore, the citizen of a Member State (and his 
spouse) was pitted against the authorities of his own State, as no apparent 
link with any other EU country could be shown to exist. The Court, however, 
focused on the fact that Mr. Carpenter’s activity consisted in the provision of 
                                                          
98 See amongst others: Simon and Lagondet, “Libre circulation des marchandises et situations purement 
internes: chronique d’une mort annoncée”, (1997) Europe chron. 9; Tagaras, “Règles communautaires de 
libre circulation, discriminations à rebours et situations dites « purement internes »” in Mélanges en 
hommage à Michel Waelbroeck, vol II (Bruylant 1999), 1499; Papadopoulou, “Situations purement 
internes et droit communautaire: un instrument jurisprudentiel à double fonction ou une arme à double 
tranchant ?”, (2001) CDE, 96-129 ; Shuibhne, “Free movement of persons and the wholly internal rule: 
time to move on?”, CML Rev. (2002), 731. 
99 Case C-363/93, Lancry, [1994] ECR I-3957 and Joined Cases C-485/93 and C-486/93, Simitzi v. Kos, 
[1995] ECR I-2665. 
100 Pistre, n. 62 above. 
101 Case C-448/98, Guimont, [2000] ECR I-10663. 
102 Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99, Reisch e.a. v. Salzburg, [2002] 
ECR I-2157; compare paras 24-27 of this judgment with paras 21-24 of Guimont. See also Case C-
300/01, Salzmann, [2003] ECR I-4899. 
103 Case C-370/90, Surinder Singh, [1992] ECR I-4265. 
104 Case C-281/98, Agnonese, [2000] ECR I-4139. 
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services – in the economic sense of the term – and that some of these 
services were offered to recipients in other Member States. Thus, the Court 
identified the two elements upon which the application of Article 49 EC lies, 
that is a) some service activity b) provided temporarily over borders.  
However, the Court avoided examining whether the two elements merged, in 
other words, whether any specific trans-border service provision was at stake 
and how this was affected by the contested measure – if at all. Consequently, 
Article 49 EC was found to apply. Following an equally disputable reasoning, 
the Court further found that the expulsion of Mrs. Carpenter would make her 
husband’s everyday life, and hence professional activity, more difficult and 
that it constituted a hindrance prohibited by Article 49 EC.105  
2.2.1.2. Extra-territorial by nature? 
Further to the Court’s broad approach to the existence of some trans-national 
element illustrated in Carpenter, some recent judgments seem to suggest that 
certain categories of services are by definition trans-national. Hence, the 
Court applies Article 49 EC without ever identify any specific trans-border 
service movement. 
The first category of services in which this seems to hold true is transport. In 
all the cases discussed above (2.1.3.1), the Court took for granted that Article 
49 applied, and only at a subsequent stage did it examine whether in fact 
services to and from other Member States were more severely affected. 
Therefore, the existence of some trans-border element did not constitute a 
prerequisite to the application of Article 49 EC, but one of the appreciations 
inherent in its application. 
A second category of services in which the Court applies Article 49 EC 
without insisting upon the existence of some trans-border element are 
advertising services. In Gourmet106, a case in which a Swedish undertaking 
was opposing the total ban imposed by Swedish law on the advertising of 
                                                          
105 For this case see the, mostly critical comments, by the editorial board of the CML Rev. (2003), 537-543, 
which in an effort to understate its objections characterizes the judgment as “remarkable”; Toner in (2003) 
EJML, 163-172, holds the reasoning of the Court to be “objectionable” “surprising and very striking”; 
Shuibhne, n. 100 above, 757 et seq., speaks of “a braking-point” to the Court’s jurisprudence. 
106 Case C-405/98, Gourmet, [2001] ECR I-1795. 
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alcoholic beverages, the Court held that “even if [the prohibition] is non-
discriminatory, [it] has a particular effect on the cross-border supply of 
advertising space, given the international nature of the advertising market in 
the category of products to which the prohibition relates, and thereby 
constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning 
of Article 59”.107 It is also called that in Carpenter the Court found Article 49 EC 
to be applicable because “significant proportion of Mr Carpenter's business 
consists of providing services, for remuneration, to advertisers established in 
other Member States”.108 
The third category of services deemed to be transnational are TV 
broadcasting and telecommunications services. Hence, in De Coster,109 which 
concerned a municipal tax imposed on parabolic antennae, the Court dealt 
dismissively with the matter, simply recalling that “it is settled case-law that 
the transmission, and broadcasting, of television signals comes within the 
rules of the Treaty relating to the provision of services” and did not feel 
compelled to inquire any further into the facts of the case before applying 
Article 49 EC. More interestingly, in Mobistar,110 which concerned a municipal 
tax imposed on GSM retransmission pylons, the Court referred to De Coster 
and took for granted that Article 49 EC applied to telecommunications 
services. At the end of the day however, the Court found no violation of the 
aforementioned provision as a) all pylons’ owners were affected in the same 
way, irrespective of their nationality and b) all telecommunications services 
were also affected similarly, irrespective of whether they were national or 
cross-border.111 This is a striking example of the Court “internalizing” the 
existence of a trans-frontier element: it is no longer used as a precondition to 
the applicability of the free movement of services rules, but rather, as an 
                                                          
107 Id., para 39, emphasis added. 
108 Carpenter, n. 9 above, para 29. It is true that in Case C-134/03, Viacom Outdoor, [2005] ECR I-1167, 
concerning a municipal tax imposed on billboard advertising, the Court declined the application of Art. 49, 
but that was more because of the lack of any substantially restrictive effect the contested measure, rather 
than because of the lack of any trans-border element. 
109 See also the note by Wenneras, “The De Coster Case: Reflections on Tax and Proportionality”, (2002) 
LIEI, 219-230. 
110 Joined Cases C-544/03 and 545/03, Mobistar & Belgacom, judgment of 8 September 2005, nyr. 
111 Id., paras 32 and 33. 
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appreciation “internal” to the said rules, leading the Court’s assessment as to 
the existence of a violation.112  
2.2.1.3. No need for extraterritoriality when EU legislation in the field? 
It has been shown above that the Court applies the Treaty rules together with, 
or instead of, the public procurement Directives.113 Long before that, the Court 
had already decided that the Directive rules apply to wholly internal 
situations.114 Henceforth, after the judgments in Coname and Parking Brixen, it 
is clear that in the field of public procurement and/or concession contracts, 
Article 49 EC shall apply without there being a need to establish a trans-
border element. The reason given for this is that the detailed secondary 
legislation in this field is not merely aimed at the abolition of all discriminations 
based on nationality, but also – and essentially – at the creation of a level 
playing field for all European companies to compete unfettered by national 
regulatory regimes.115 The fact that principles enshrined in secondary 
legislation apply irrespective of the presence of a trans-national element has 
been clearly confirmed, more recently, in relation to the data protection 
Directive,116 in Österreichischer Rundfunk.117 This finding could lead to a 
greater number of services being governed by Article 49 EC without any 
transnational element being necessary; in any case, it could offer a plausible 
explanation for some of the judgments presented above.118 In fact, all 
transport, telecommunications and TV broadcasting, and to a lesser extent 
advertising, have been regulated at EU level by secondary legislation texts. 
2.2.2. Remuneration 
The existence of remuneration is, according to Article 50 EC, the feature 
which gives any activity its economic nature, thus bringing it within the scope 
                                                          
112 This seems to constitute a shift from previous case-law, in particular Case C-108/96, Mac Quen, [2001] 
ECR I-837. Further for the judgments in De Coster and Mobistar, see 3.1. below. 
113 See 2.1.4.2. above. 
114 Case Storbaelt supra, n. 55. 
115 Id. para 33. 
116 Directive 95/46/EC of the Council of 24 October 1995, OJ L281/31. 
117 Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, Österreichischer Rundfunk, [2003] ECR I-4989, para 42. 
See also Keppenne and Van Raepenbusch, “Les principaux développements de la jurisprudence de la 
Cour de Justice et du Tribunal de Première Instance, Année 2003”,  (2004) CDE, 439-513, who also make 
out this point. 
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of the Treaty freedoms. The basic definition of what constitutes remuneration, 
for the purposes of Article 49 EC, was given by the Court in Humbel: “the 
essential characteristic of remuneration lies in the fact that it constitutes 
consideration for the service in question and is normally agreed upon between 
the provider and the recipient of the service”.119 This definition, however, has 
been considerably watered down, though not completely abandoned,120 in 
recent cases. In Deliège the Court accepted that nonprofessional athletes 
could nonetheless receive remuneration for their “services” in an indirect way, 
through TV broadcasting, sponsorships, participation in publicity campaigns 
etc. In the healthcare cases discussed above (2.1.4.3), the Court accepted 
that “the payments made by the sickness insurance funds [for treatment 
delivered to insured patients], albeit set at a flat rate, are indeed the 
consideration for the hospital services and unquestionably represent 
remuneration for the hospital which receives them”.121  Thus, consideration 
was found to exist not only in triangular situations,122 but, more importantly, in 
situations where the correlation between services received and moneys paid 
is only indirect if economically nonexistent. Further, in Danner and Skandia 
the Court accepted that remuneration can be paid well in advance for a 
service which is to be delivered over 30 years later, i.e. the payment of an old-
age pension. The above judgments leave us with a concept of remuneration 
which is extremely flexible, if not ever expandable – a serious challenge for 
legal certainty. It must be borne in mind that in Humbel the Court, alongside 
the technical criterion as to what constitutes remuneration, also used two 
further criteria upon which the application of the Treaty rules should rest: a) a 
political one: that the activity in question is primarily an economic one, rather 
than the fulfillment of the States’ social policy engagements and b) an 
economic one: that the activity in question is paid for (directly or indirectly) by 
the actual service recipients, not by taxpayers in general.123 It is submitted, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
118 See 2.2.1.2. above. 
119 Case 263/86, Belgian State v. Humbel, [1988] ECR 5365, para 17. 
120 Cases as recent as Danner and Skandia,  ns. 66 and 70 above, respectively, the Court explicitly referred 
itself to this judgment; see paras 26 and 23 of the respective judgments. Also the “services” draft directive 
(Rec. 16) makes use of this very definition. 
121 Smits & Peerbooms, n. 81 above, para 58, emphasis added. 
122 Which has already been accepted since Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders and Others, [1988] ECR 
2085, para 16. 
123 Humbel, n. 121 above, para 18. 
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with all due respect, that if the Court is not willing to make use of these two 
criteria, then it should at least adopt a consistent and non accordion-like 
approach to the concept of remuneration. 
2.2.3. Who can claim protection under Article 49 EC 
The category of persons entitled to claim protection under Article 49 EC has 
been considerably broadened. In Schnitzer, Corsten, Eurowings 124 and other 
“posted workers” cases, the Court accepted that the rules on the free 
provision of services could be relied upon not only by the provider or the 
recipient individually, but also by the recipient claiming rights on behalf of the 
provider.125 Hence, in the cases above, the service recipients of construction 
and other services were allowed to claim rights accruing to their service 
providers, in order to shield themselves from prosecutions by the authorities 
of their own Member States.126 The same right was also recognized 
(concerning the road transport of goods) to a German company which was 
using a Turkish service provider, by virtue of the Association Agreement with 
Turkey, in Abatay.127 In line with the same logic, but in a much more radical 
way, the Court recognized in Carpenter that the spouse of a service provider 
can claim extensive protection based on her own rights granted to her in her 
capacity, as an auxiliary to the activity of the main beneficiary. Pushing this 
same logic to its limits, in Zhu & Chen the Court accepted that an Irish-born 
baby girl, qualified as a “service recipient” in the UK where she was receiving 
treatment at the expense of her Chinese father and, further, granted a right to 
remain in  the UK to her Chinese mother (it is of note that the father who was 
paying for both of them had no rights whatsoever under EU law).128  
However, the judgment in Oulane129 should be seen as the outer limit of this 
extremely extensive interpretation of who constitutes a beneficiary of the 
                                                          
124 Case Schnitzer, supra, n. 20; Case C-58/98 Corsten, [2000] ECR I-7919; Case C-294/97, Eurowings, 
(1999) ECR I-7447. 
125 See in particular para 20 of Corsten. 
126 A similar solution has also been adopted in the field of workers, see Case C-350/96, Clean Car, [1998] 
ECR I-2521. 
127 Joined Cases 317/01 and 369/01, Abatay & Sahin, [2003] ECR I-12301. 
128 Case C-200/02, Zhu & Chen, [2004] I-9925; see also the case note by Carlier in CML Rev. (2005), 1121-
1131. 
129 See n. 13 above. 
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freedom to receive services. This case is authority for the proposition that a 
French person who was arrested in Amsterdam with no papers, no declared 
residence and no money could not be presumed, but had to prove his 
capacity as a service recipient.  
2.3. Relation to the other freedoms 
The question of whether, in complex factual situations, the rules on services 
should apply alone, cumulatively with some other Treaty freedoms, or not at 
all, has been the subject of longstanding consideration.130 The latest case law 
of the Court, however, seems to address, to some extent, previous 
inconsistencies. As a rule of thumb, it may be said that any given factual 
situation cannot, in principle, violate both the provisions on services and on 
goods: one of the two sets of rules should be prevalent (2.3.1). This being 
said however, the same set of rules may simultaneously obstruct persons 
wishing, either to permanently establish or to temporarily provide services 
within another Member State: more often than not such will, in fact, be the 
case (2.3.2). Finally, the simultaneous violation of the rules on services and 
the ones on capital also seems possible, although in many cases, for reasons 
of judicial economy, the Court will only give judgment on one of the two 
grounds (2.3.3).  
2.3.1. Goods 
Both the principle and the exception thereto were clearly set out by the Court 
in Canal Satelite Digital.131 At stake was the Spanish legislation which 
required operators of conditional-access television services to register in a 
national register, indicating the characteristics of the technical equipment they 
use, and to subsequently obtain administrative certification of this equipment. 
These rules were challenged by reference to various Directives, and also 
under Articles 28 and 49 EC. The Court, referring to Schindler,132 stated that 
“[w]here a national measure restricts both the free movement of goods and 
the freedom to provide services, the Court will in principle examine it in 
                                                          
130 Hatzopoulos, n. 1 above,  para 2.2. 
131 Case C-390/99, Canal Satelite Digital, [2002] ECR I-607. 
132 Case C-275/92, Schindler, [1994] ECR I-1039, para 22. 
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relation to one only of those two fundamental freedoms where it is shown that, 
in the circumstances of the case, one of them is entirely secondary in relation 
to the other and may be considered together with it”.  
The rule being thus set, it has been constantly confirmed thereafter133 and 
applied with some consistency. Hence, in Cura Anlagem  and Omega,134 both 
concerning leasing contracts, the Court applied solely the rules on services, 
even though the supply of goods was also at stake “since the supply relates 
not so much to the goods themselves as to their use by the lessee, the goods 
in question remaining the property of the lessor”.135 In Anomar, a case 
concerning restrictions imposed in Portugal on the use of slot machines, the 
Court held that “the operation of slot machines is linked to operations to 
import them”136 but only examined the contested measure under Article 49 
EC.137 Furthermore, in De Coster the Court was only asked to consider the 
compatibility of the Belgian measure which taxed parabolic antennae with 
Article 49 EC.  Despite the fact that the case involved the taxation of goods, 
the Court considered the issues related to TV broadcasting to be of much 
greater importance than antennae trade.138 In fact, the Court discarded 
considerations relating to the free movement of goods in such a unequivocal 
manner that when putting forward alternative, less restrictive, measures to the 
incriminated tax, it did not hesitate to suggest a requirement as to the size of 
the dishes: a measure which would clearly constitute a restriction to Article 28 
                                                          
133 See Omega, n. 12 above, para 26, and Case C-71/02, Karner, [2004] ECR I-3025, para 46. The latter is a 
very peculiar case (see 5.2.2 below) in which the Court’s attachment to the idea expressed supra that it 
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C-20/03, Burmanger, Van der Linden & De Jong, [2005] ECR I-4133, which concerned restrictions to the 
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136 Case C-6/01, Anomar, [2003] ECR I-8621, para 55. For this, and the other gambling cases, see 4.1. below. 
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between the fundamental Treaty freedoms): although Art. 31 EC on the abolition of commercial 
monopolies is not applicable to services, the solution reached under Art. 49 is perfectly identical; see also 
Straetmans in CML Rev (2004), 1409-1428, 1412. 
138 Probably, like the parties themselves, the Court realized that, in view of its own case law, Art. 49 was the 
most promising venue to challenge the Belgian legislation at stake. 
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EC.139 Similarly in Deutsche Post,140 where the fees charged for bulk mail 
coming from other Member States by the incumbent monopolist were at issue, 
the Court promptly affirmed the obvious, that postal services are “services” 
and thus Article 28 did not need to be considered. Finally, in all three 
judgments concerning the Loi Evin and the advertising of alcoholic beverages 
during sporting events,141 the Court clearly focused its attention on the 
advertising services involved, and did not pay any attention to the free 
movement of goods aspects of the case. Hence, it rejected the French 
Government’s argument according to which the measure was compatible with 
the Treaty since it did not discriminate between alcoholic beverages in respect 
of their origin. The Court reiterated that “in the context of the freedom to 
provide services it is only the origin of the service at issue which may be 
relevant to the case”.142 
There are, however, exceptional cases in which both the rules on goods and 
services will apply. This may happen in two cases. First of all, where the 
economic activity involved is such that it is impossible to establish a hierarchy 
between goods and services, as was the case with telecommunications 
services in Canal Satelite. Secondly, where the contested measure is such as 
to simultaneously restrict free movement of both goods and services, as was 
the case with the total ban on the advertisement of alcoholic beverages in 
Gourmet. In the former situation the Treaty rules on goods and services will 
be applied simultaneously.143 Hence, in Canal Satelite the Court, when looking 
for justifications for the contested Spanish measure held, without any 
distinction, “that informing and protecting consumers, as users of products or 
services, constitute legitimate grounds of public interest which are in principle 
capable of justifying restrictions on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by 
the Treaty”.144 Where, however, a measure restricts both Articles 28 and 49, it 
                                                          
139 See De Coster, n. 26 above, para 38, and Wenneras, n. 109 above, which highlight this point. 
140 Case C-147/97, Deutsche Post, [2000] ECR I-825. Further for this case see 3.2.2. below. 
141 Case C-318/00, Bacardi-Martini & Cellier des Dauphins, [2003] ECR I-905; Case C-262/02, Commission v. 
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142 Commission v. France, para 29. 
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144 Id., para 34. Convergence. 
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is unclear how the Court will proceed in the future. Although in Gourmet it 
went separately through each one of the fundamental freedoms, and this was 
systemically correct (because the measure had two associated but distinct 
faces) ,145 it need not necessarily do so in the future, in view of the “ bringing 
together” of the freedoms. 146 
2.3.2 Establishment – Workers 
The borderline between the scope of the provisions on services and those on 
workers has always been quite clear. Unlike service providers, workers do not 
engage in an independent activity. Hence, with the exception of the “posted 
workers” saga,147 Articles 39 and 49 EC are generally easy to distinguish. 
Much more tenuous is the delineation between the rules on establishment and 
those on services. In both cases we are in presence of independent economic 
agents, who pursue their activity in another Member State, either on a 
permanent or on a temporary basis. In defining the respective scope of 
application of Articles 43 and 49 EC, in cases where the two freedoms could 
be at stake, the recent case-law of the Court moves into two directions.148  
First, as it has been shown above (at 2.1.2), the Court greatly stresses the 
time span during Article 49 remains applicable over activities which, 
                                                          
145 This distinction may further be understood through the comparison of the judgment in Gourmet with those 
concerning the Loi Evin: both concerned an advertising  ban on alcoholic drinks, but only the former was 
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European Legal Studies at the College of Europe - 30 ans d'études juridiques européennes au Collège 
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Movement in EU Law (Oxford 2001) the extremely interesting contributions by Poiares Maduro, pp. 41-68, 
Snell and Andenas, pp. 69-140, Jarass, pp. 141-163, and Hansen, pp. 197-210. 
147 For which see Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98, Finalarte, 
[2001] ECR I-7831, paras 20-23 and the developments at 4.2. below. 
148 The clear-cut cases, where the factual setting clearly points to the applicable Treaty provision, are left out 
from the present analysis: see e.g. Case C-302/98, Sehrer, [2000] ECR I-4585, and Mac Quen, n. 114 
above, where the Court applied exclusively Art. 43 EC to service activities which, however, clearly implied 
some permanent establishment. See, on the other hand, Case C-234/01, Gerritse, [2003] ECR I-5933, 
concerning the temporary performance of a Dutch musician in Germany, where the Court reformulated the 
question referred to it and inquired into the compatibility of the contested measure with Art. 49 EC, rather 
than with Art. 43 EC. 
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economically, qualify as services. More importantly, in these cases the Court 
seems to be abandoning the criteria of duration, periodicity, repetitiveness etc 
introduced by Gebhard, in favor of a criterion based primarily on the economic 
nature of the activity and secondarily on the intent of the service provider to 
enter permanently the labour market of the host State. By the same token, the 
Court establishes a presumption according to which every activity which 
qualifies economically as being a service should, a priori, be treated under the 
rules on services.149 
Second, the Court will simultaneously apply the rules on services and on 
establishment when the contested national measure prohibits or renders more 
difficult the pursuance of an economic activity both on a temporary and on a 
permanent basis. Such was the case in Gambelli,150 where Stanley, a UK firm, 
had created a subsidiary in Italy in order to promote sports’ gambling (Art. 43), 
while at the same time it wished to offer gambling opportunities over the 
Internet (Art. 49). Similarly, in Gräbner 151 the Court qualified the complete 
prohibition of the exercise of the activities of “heilpraktikers” imposed by the 
Austrian legislation as a restriction on both Articles 43 and 49 EC. Likewise, in 
the Commission v. Portugal, private security firms case (discussed at 2.1.2.) 
the Court held that the requirement of permanent establishment constituted a 
violation of Article 49 EC, while the requirements that the economic operator 
be constituted as a legal person and have a minimum share capital were 
found to violate both the rules on establishment and on services. In fact, since 
the dividing line between the rules on establishment and those on services 
hinges upon the duration of the activity, or even on the intent of the person 
engaged therein, most restrictive national measures will infringe both 
freedoms.152 Then, it is the precise factual situation prevailing in each case 
which will determine whether Article 43, 49, or both, apply.  
                                                          
149 See the developments at 2.1.2. above. 
150 Case C-243/01, Gambelli, [2003] ECR I-13031. 
151 Case C-294/00, Gräbner, [2002] ECR I-6515. 
152 The more general the prohibition, the more likely to infringe both freedoms and, in some occasions, also 
the free movement of workers, see e.g. Case Commission v. Italy, Private Security Firms, n. 31 above, 
where the Italian restrictions to the activities of private securities were found to violate all three freedoms. 
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There remain, however, some national measures, which only infringe the 
rules on services.153 These include residence (or equivalent) requirements,154 
as well as indistinctly applicable measures, with which it is disproportionate to 
compel the service provider to comply: registration, authorization etc.155 In this 
respect, it is important to note that the Court insists on an extensive and in-
depth application of the mutual recognition principle, whereby any control 
which has been effectively carried out in the state of origin of the service 
provider may not be duplicated in the host state.156 
2.3.3. Capitals 
As with the workers/establishment provisions considered above, the choice 
between on the one hand, the rules on capitals and, on the other, those on 
services, is to a great extent dependent upon the factual situation and the 
submissions of the parties. It must be kept in mind that the direct applicability 
of the rules on capitals has only been recognized since 1995.157 Since then an 
important body of case law on capitals has been developed.158 It remains, 
however, that few cases are argued exclusively under the rules on capitals 
(more often than not the same measure will also be impeding some other 
freedoms) and that in many cases where capitals are argued together with 
services, the Court identifies some restriction to the latter and does not go on 
to examine the former. Hence, all the cases where restrictions were imposed 
upon the participation of individuals in pension schemes in other Member 
States were exclusively decided under the rules on services, despite the fact 
that they also concerned the movement of capitals. As observed in our 
previous overview, the same does not seem to hold true for infringement 
proceedings. In those the Court is more ready to establish as many 
infringement grounds as possible. Thus in Commission v. Italy, temporary 
                                                          
153 Of course, there remain cases where Art. 43 EC is the only provision applicable: see e.g. Case C-79/01, 
Payroll Data Services, [2002] ECR I-8923. 
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labor agencies159 the Court examined first Article 49, then 56 and found that 
both had been violated. The Court followed an absolutely parallel reasoning,160 
based on the fact that obligations accomplished (Art. 49) and financial 
guarantees established (Art. 56) in the host member State were not taken into 
due consideration and, thus, the principle of mutual recognition was not 
respected.  
 
2.3.4. Competition 
The fact that the Treaty rules on the internal market and those on competition 
pursue, to a large extent, parallel objectives and, inevitably, converge in many 
aspects, has been sufficiently documented.161 In the period under 
consideration such a convergence may be identified at, at least, three levels.  
First, it has been demonstrated above (at 2.1.4.), that the Court uses similar 
criteria in order to determine whether an economic activity is at stake, both 
under Articles 81 and 82 and under Article 49 EC.  
Second, the Court confirmed that restrictions to Article 49 CE may be justified 
by virtue of Article 86(2) EC, on services of general economic interest. This 
was expressly stated for the first time in Corsica Ferries France, concerning 
specific mooring arrangements for vessels entering Italian ports.162 However, 
in this case the Court held the Italian measure to be justified not only on the 
basis of the public service mission at stake, under Article 86(2), but also on 
the need to preserve public security, presumably under Article 46. This 
judgment, characterized as “unhappy”,163 created some ambiguity as to the 
concepts of “public service” and “public security”, obscuring the precise 
content of the justification ground used by the Court. The Court confirmed, 
beyond any doubt, that Article 86(2) may be used as a valid justification for 
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violations of the rules on services. In Deutsche Post it held that, in view of the 
specific mission accomplished by the incumbent monopolist, an alleged 
violation of Articles 49 junto 82 could be justified by Article 86(2) EC. It can 
hardly be said that this judgment sheds much more light on the issue in 
question, insofar as both Articles 49 and 82 were jointly at stake. It does, 
however, constitute a further occasion in which Article 86(2) was used to 
neutralize a violation of the free provision of services.164 
Third, in an even more unclear way, the Court did the reverse, i.e. it 
recognized that mandatory requirements in the sense of Article 49 EC may 
shield the application of the competition rules. In Wouters165 the prohibition 
imposed by the Dutch Bar association on its members, precluding them from 
entering into multi-disciplinary professional partnerships (notably with 
accountants), was challenged under Articles 81, 82 and, 43 and 49 EC. The 
Court found that the Bar association did constitute an association of 
undertakings and, further, that the prohibition in question did restrict the 
freedom of commercial action of some of its members. Thereafter, however, 
the Court made an unprecedented statement: “[h]owever, not every 
agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of 
undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of 
them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty […]. More particularly, account must be taken of its objectives, which 
are here connected with the need to make rules relating to organization, 
qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure 
that the ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound administration of 
justice are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and 
experience”.166  And the Court quoted cases Reisebüro Broede and Klopp,167 
about services and establishment, respectively. This is a breakthrough 
decision in the field of competition where, traditionally, only the express 
exceptions of Article 81(3) and, arguably, some ill defined rule of reason 
                                                          
164 It has to be reminded that the Court has also held that Art. 86(2) EC may also justify restrictions to Art. 31 
EC. On the prohibition of commercial monopolies in relation to the free movement of goods, see Case C-
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165 Case C-309/99, Wouters, [2002] ECR I-1577. 
166 Id. para 97. 
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inherent in Article 81(1),168 may justify exceptions to the basic competition 
rules. It is worth noting that if a rule of reason does exist within Article 81(1), it 
is highly disputed whether this should be solely based on the so called 
“competition balance sheet”, or the more comprehensive “economic balance 
sheet” of every agreement or other restrictive practice. In this judgment, for 
the first time in such an explicit way, the Court takes up objectives which are 
completely foreign to competition, or even to broadly economic 
considerations, yet constitute typical overriding reasons of general interest.169 
 
3. Violations – justifications for violations 
3.1. Violations: bringing services in line with the other freedoms? 
In our previous overview we had pointed out that, despite the use of uniform 
language and common general principles for all four freedoms, the Court 
occasionally pushes the freedom to provide services further than the other 
freedoms.170 This point may have been taken into account by litigators, who 
increasingly tend to bring actions under the free movement of services rules, 
even though these actions actually concern goods.  
Hence, in Gourmet the Swedish prohibition on advertising of alcoholic 
beverages was challenged under both the rules on goods and on services.171 
More recently, however, a comparable prohibition imposed by the French Loi 
Evin was only challenged under the rules on services.172 More interesting still, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
167 Case C-3/95, Reisebüro Broede, [1996] ECR I-6511 and Case 107/83, Klopp, [1984] ECR 2971, 
respectively. 
168 See, amongst others, Whish, Competition Law, 5th ed. (Kluwer, 2003), pp. 121 et seq.; Jones and Sufrin, 
EC Competition Law – text, cases, and materials, 2d ed. (Oxford Press, 2004), pp. 224 et seq. ; Fasquelle, 
Droit américain et droit communautaire des ententes, Etude de la règle de raison, éd. Joly (Paris, 1993); 
Kovar, “Le droit communautaire de la concurrence et la règle de raison”, (1987) RTDE, 237; Wills, “Rule of 
reason: une règle raisonnable en droit communautaire?”, (1990) CDE, 19. See also the CFI apparently 
rejecting the idea of a rule of reason implicit in Art. 81(1) in Case T-112/99, Métropole v. Commission, 
[2001] ECR II-2459. 
169 See also Vossestein expressing his surprise in his annotation of this case in CML Rev. (2002), 841-863 
and 858-859. 
170 Hatzopoulos, n. 1 above, paras 4.1. and 4.2. 
171 It is remembered that in this case the Court tilted position from its previous judgment in Cases 34 to 36/95, 
De Agostini & TV Shop, [1997] ECR I-3843 and held that both freedoms where infringed under similar 
conditions. 
172 See supra, n. 141. 
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in Commission v Belgium, loyalty programmes,173 the Commission challenged 
a selling arrangement under Article 49 EC: the Belgian administrative and 
judicial practice, which allegedly applied the rules on promotional sales in a 
more favourable manner to domestic retail outlets than to those established in 
other Member States. Similarly, in De Coster and Mobistar the Belgian system 
of taxing parabolic antennae and GSM pylons, respectively, was challenged 
exclusively under Article 49 EC.  
It would seem, however, that through its judgments in the above cases, the 
Court has progressively brought its case-law on services in line with that on 
the other freedoms, especially its goods jurisprudence (or vice versa? see 
below). This evolution of the Court’s case-law merits tracing, as it may 
constitute the final and – at last coherent – act to the Keck drama, initiated 
back in 1993.174  
The first bold move was taken by the Court in Gourmet. In this case the 
Swedish prohibition on advertising alcoholic drinks was tested under both the 
rules on goods and on services. Although measures concerning advertising 
have been qualified as selling arrangements in the sense of Keck,175 in this 
case the Court refused to follow a strictly formalistic approach. On the 
contrary, the Court examined the substance of the contested measure and 
found that it affected imported products more adversely than domestic ones.176 
Hence, it held Article 28 EC to be infringed, only to continue by examining 
Article 30 EC and to find that public health could justify the contested 
measure, subject to the requirement of proportionality. The Court followed a 
perfectly parallel reasoning in relation to the free movement of services.177 
Hence, from this case, we are left with a) a refusal to mechanically apply the 
                                                          
173 Case C-287/03, Commission v. Belgium, Loyalty Programmes, [2005] ECR I-3761. 
174 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck & Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097. 
175 But not always: for the unclear case law of the Court in the field of advertisement see, among many, 
Greaves, “Advertising restrictions and the free movement of goods and services”, (1998) ELRev, 305; 
Vaqué, “La sentencia ‘Laura’: punto final de la juriprudencia ‘Keck y Mithouard’?”,,(1998) Gac.Jur.CE, 5; 
and before that, Todino and Lüder, “La jurisprudence Keck en matière de publicité: vers un marché unique 
inachevé?”, (1995) RMUE, 171. 
176 Gourmet, n. 108 above, paras 21 and 25. 
177 Convergence; for more complete accounts of the Gourmet judgment, see Biondi, “Advertising alcohol and 
the free movement principle: the Gourmet decision”, (2001) ELRev, 616-622; Kaczorowska, “Gourmet can 
have his Keck and eat it!”, (2004) ELJ, 479-494; and Stuyck, “Gourmet: une nouvelle brèche dans la 
jurisprudence « Keck »?”, (2001) CDE, 683-706. 
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formal distinction between selling arrangements and other measures and b) a 
strict parallelism in the way that Articles 28 and 49 EC are applied. 
The second step in the Court’s case-law, relates to the Belgian cases 
concerning the taxation of parabolic antennae and GSM pylons. Cases De 
Coster and Mobistar go together to the extent that the former marks the high-
water application of the rules on services, while the latter is indicative of a 
retreat and an effort of rationalization. In De Coster an annual tax of BEF 
5000 (approx. 100 euros) to be paid by every owner of a parabolic antenna 
was at stake. The Court established a link between the said tax imposed on 
goods, on the one hand, and trans-border services, on the other: this made 
the reception of satellite programs, which would mostly be of foreign origin, 
more expensive than the reception of programs transmitted by cable, which 
would be predominantly domestic. Hence, Belgian consumers would be less 
inclined to look into TV services offered by broadcasters abroad, and, 
conversely, foreign broadcasters would have demand for their services 
artificially lessened.178 Further, the Court found the tax to be both inappropriate 
and disproportionate to achieve the environmental concerns put forward by 
the Belgian authorities. The abovementioned findings of the Court are not 
beyond contention.179 What is certain, however, is that the measure in 
question could not be seriously challenged under any of the goods provisions, 
as it amounted to neither a discriminatory internal taxation in the sense of 
Article 90 EC, nor to a measure of equivalent affect to a quantitative restriction 
in the sense of Article 28 EC.180   
The factual differences between this and the Mobitel case are marginal. In the 
latter, the Belgian authorities imposed a one-off tax upon owners of GSM 
pylons and other transmission equipment, i.e. not to the recipients but to the 
providers of telecommunications services. Again, the amount of the tax was 
quite substantial (BEF 100.000 = approx. 2.000 euros per pylon). This tax 
certainly had the effect of making mobile telecommunications more expensive 
for users. However, it affected all service providers, all consumers (at least 
                                                          
178 De Coster, n. 26 above, paras 32-34. 
179 See the critical note of this case by Wenneras, n. 109 above. 
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those established in the relevant area) and all communications in exactly the 
same way, irrespective of whether there were local, national, or international. 
In light of this factual scenario, the Court after reiterating some of its findings 
in De Coster, went out of its way to make the following remarkable statement: 
“measures, the only effect of which is to create additional costs in respect of 
the service in question and which affect in the same way the provision of 
services between Member States and that within one Member State, do not 
fall within the scope of Article 59 [now 49] of the Treaty.”181  
In view of Advocate General Tesauro’s (in)famous opinion in Hunermünd, the 
thousands of pages of post-Keck  literature and the chaotic case law in this 
field, it may still be worth inquiring whether the statement above is all what 
Keck was (or should be) about. This test is not as sophisticated as the 
analyses proposed by some authors,182 nor does it provide a complete 
framework for explaining the totality of the Court’s case law. It has, however, 
several advantages. First, it does away with the unworkable distinction 
between “selling arrangements” and “all other measures”. By the same token, 
it makes the convergence of the case-law concerning goods and services 
possible, since it eliminates the basic obstacle thereto: it has repeatedly been 
stated that “if the distinction ‘selling arrangements/all other measures’ is an 
inadequate criterion for regulating the free movement of goods, it is wholly 
inappropriate for ensuring the free provision of services”.183 Second, the test 
proposed in Mobitel has the advantage of accommodating some of the 
judgments in which the Court applied Keck although imported goods were 
shown to be affected more severely,184 and many of those in which Keck was 
not applied, despite the fact that they could be said to concern selling 
                                                                                                                                                                      
180 Case 47/88, Commission v. Denmark, Taxation of Cars, [1990] ECR 4509 and Case C-383/01, Danske 
Bilimporter, [2003] ECR I-6065. 
181 Mobitel, para 31. 
182 See among the most recent literature: Oliver and Roth, “The Internal Market and the Four Freedoms”, n. 
148 above; also the remarkable contribution by Toner, “Non-discriminatory obstacles to the exercise of 
Treaty rights – Articles 39, 43, 49 and 18 EC, 23/2004 YEL”, (2005) OUP, 278-302, building upon Barnard, 
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“Discrimination in Community free movement law”, (1999) ELRev, 445-462. Also, the numerous excellent 
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183 Hatzopoulos, n. 1 above, 67-68, where reference is also made to Alpine Investments as annotated by the 
same author, n. 7 above. See also Oliver and Roth, supra, n. 148 above, 414, adopting a similar view. 
184 E.g. Case C-391/92, Commission v. Greece, Infants’ Milk, [1995] ECR I-1621. 
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arrangements.185 Third, the former part of the test proposed, according to 
which it shall be ascertained whether the contested measure merely adds up 
cost or creates a material burden, is a relatively straight forward one and does 
not call for “theological” determinations like the concept of “selling 
arrangements”;186 of course, the latter part of the Court’s enquiry, as to 
whether the burden in question affects the provision of services “in the same 
way”, remains as problematic as the equivalent wording in the Keck formula. 
Fourth, by introducing the dichotomy “expense – other burden” the Court 
seems to be adopting some kind of “a rule of reason”. Such a rule, however, 
is not a mechanic application of the de minimis principle, based on a strictly 
quantitative criteria (since a relatively high economic burden would still evade 
the Court’s control), but rather an appreciation of the material situation of the 
person making use of the Treaty freedoms. This reading also accommodates 
all the “third way” judgments of the ECJ, such as Krantz, Motorradcenter, 
Peralta, Centro Servizi Spediporto, Corsica Ferries III, Laeso, 187 in the field of 
goods, Volker Graf  in the field of workers188 and ED v. Fenocchio in the field 
of capitals.189 Whatever the merits of the test proposed in Mobitel, this case 
suggests that a) the Court will not deal with goods’ cases under the rules of 
on services and b) more importantly, the rules on goods and on services may 
henceforth apply in a parallel way. 
The third category of cases just adds up to the previous findings in the sense 
that the Court displays an increasingly moderate test of violation of Article 49 
EC. Hence, in Commission v Germany, journalists,190 the Court declined to 
follow the Commission in holding that the German legislation – which made it 
compulsory for press undertakings to contribute to a social security scheme 
                                                          
185 E.g. Gourmet, n. 108 above; also Case C-315/92, Clinique, [1994] ECR I-317. 
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188 Case C-190/98, Volker Graf, [2000] ECR I-493. 
189 Case C-412/97, ED c/ Fenocchio, [1999] ECR I-3845. 
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for all their self-employed personnel – constituted a restriction to Article 49 
EC, in that it disadvantaged personnel living in other Member States where it 
already contributed to a similar scheme. The Court found that the employers’ 
charge could not be passed over to the employees, in the form of a reduction 
of their remuneration, and hence could not discourage them from offering 
services in Germany. On the flip side, the charge for employers was the same 
for all employees, irrespective of their place of habitual residence. It is worth 
noting that in justifying its findings the Court had to expressly distinguish this 
case from at least three previous cases decided differently.191 In the same 
vein, more recently, the Court rejected yet another alleged violation of Article 
49 EC in Commission v. Belgium, loyalty programmes. The Commission 
alleged that the concepts of “similarity of products” and “sole vendor” upon 
which the Belgian legislation for authorizing linked promotional offers relied, 
was applied in such a way as to privilege domestically established distribution 
chains at the expense of those from other Member States. The Commission 
thought that this was a restriction to the free provision of services. It is not 
clear which services the Commission was referring to (probably distribution 
services in the sense of Praktiker Bau, in which the Court recognized the 
possibility to obtain a trade-mark in respect of distribution services).192 What is 
clear, however, is that the Belgian legislation and practice could not be 
usefully challenged under the rules on goods, given that it was evidently a 
selling arrangement very similar to the one at stake in Keck. The Court 
resisted the Commission’s arguments by holding that the latter had failed to 
prove the discriminatory and disproportionate character of the alleged 
practices. Hence, again, the idea that the Court is not willing to apply double 
standards to goods and services and to resolve goods situations by reference 
to the service rules is present. 
                                                          
191 Id., paras 33-34, where the Court distinguishes Cases C-34/98, Commission v. France, [2000] ECR I-995; 
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3.2. Justifications to restrictions 
3.2.1. General 
Just like the case law concerning the violations of Article 49 EC, the 
jurisprudence concerning the justifications thereto is also reaching maturity. 
Three main tendencies may be discerned during the period under 
examination. 
First, the Court increasingly treats the express justifications provided for by 
the Treaty without distinguishing them from the mandatory requirements 
recognized by its own jurisprudence. Hence in Gambelli the Court first 
established that the Italian legislation which reserved gambling only to state-
authorized agents was contrary to both Articles 43 and 49 EC. Then it went on 
“to consider whether such restrictions are acceptable as exceptional 
measures expressly provided for in Articles 45 and 46 EC, or justified, in 
accordance with the case-law of the Court, for reasons of overriding general 
interest.”193 Despite the use of a double-headed formula 
(acceptable/justified)194 this single paragraph leaded to a unitary analysis of 
the conditions which should be fulfilled by the contested measures for them to 
be justified under either heading. In fact, after this bi-polar introductory 
paragraph, the Court pursued a classical “mandatory requirements” analysis 
based on its previous judgments in Schindler, Läärä and Zenatti.195However, 
the Court also brought Article 46 EC into the picture. This may be explained 
by the fact that the contested Italian legislation nurtured a de facto 
discrimination, as it allowed CONI, a state monopoly, to give out 
authorizations to agents all of which were Italian.  
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Drawing on Gambelli, the Court in Commission v France, Loi Evin took a step 
further in recognizing a single justification theory, based indistinctively on 
express and judge-made exceptions. The Court held that “the freedom to 
provide services may […] be limited by national rules justified by the reasons 
mentioned in Article 56(1) of the EC Treaty, read together with Article 66, or 
for overriding requirements of the general interest”.196 The language used by 
the Court in this excerpt marks a clear step towards the fusion of the two 
series of justifications, as it refers to both in an interchangeable manner. This 
finding of the Court is followed by an extensive evaluation of the public health 
objective. It is reminded that public health is an exception expressly (?) 
foreseen by all the justificatory provisions of the Treaty (Articles 30, 39(3) and 
46), for which the Court has specifically held that it could not constitute a 
mandatory requirement.197 It should also be noted that the French measure at 
stake in this case was non discriminatory. 
The position of the Court after these (and other) cases may be summed up as 
follows: a) there is a single justification theory which encompasses both 
express and judge-made exceptions, b) the choice of whether a national 
measure will be examined under a Treaty exception or under a mandatory 
requirement is primarily linked to the nature of the objective pursued by the 
national measure in question – not to the existence of discrimination, c) Treaty 
exceptions will justify both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory measures, d) 
mandatory requirements will justify all non discriminatory measures and those 
discriminatory ones which are not flagrantly so.198 In the latter case the 
requirement of non-discrimination will be entered through the back door, as a 
part of the necessity and proportionality test.199 
Second, the existence of a single justification theory may also be verified 
across the different Treaty freedoms.200 In this respect two judgments are most 
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Andenas and Roth (Eds.), n. 148 above, pp. 163-196. 
 43
characteristic. In Gambelli, the Court, in separate parts of its judgment, 
identified violations to Article 43, then 49 EC. Then it went on, in a single set 
of paragraphs, to check whether these violations could be justified, without 
distinguishing at all between the two sets of rules. In a more surprising way, in 
Deutscher Apothekerverband v Doc Morris,201 the Court took a logical leap 
which can only be explained by the idea that the same set of justifications is 
valid in all four freedoms. This case concerned the activity of a Dutch 
pharmacist who was selling medicines on a mail-order basis and over the 
Internet to (among others) German consumers. An action was brought against 
him by the German association of Pharmacists for violation of the German 
legislation concerning the conditions and prices applicable to medicinal 
products. Despite the service issues stemming from the use of the Internet, 
the Court (implicitly) held that the main aspect of Doc Morris’ activity was the 
sale of goods and only examined the compatibility of the German legislation 
under Article 28 EC. In this respect the Court distinguished between 
prescription and non-prescription medicines. For the former the Court found 
that the restrictions of the German legislation were not admissible. For the 
latter the Court distinguished between, on the one hand, the rule that 
medication should only be sold in pharmacies, which it found justified under 
the public health requirements of Article 30 EC and, on the other hand, the 
fixed prices imposed by the German legislation. In relation to this latter 
requirement the reasoning of the Court is surprising, to say the least. It states 
that “although aims of a purely economic nature cannot justify restricting the 
fundamental freedom to provide services, it is not impossible that the risk of 
seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security system may 
constitute an overriding general-interest reason capable of justifying a 
restriction of that kind”;202 and it goes on to cite cases Kohl, Smits & 
Peerbooms and Müller-Fauré, all dealing with services. In the following 
paragraph, however, the Court is led to reject the above justification, as none 
of the parties had submitted arguments to this effect. In other words the Court 
on its own motion, and despite the fact that the parties had made no such 
arguments, is examining whether a restriction to the free movement of goods 
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may be justified by an exception to the free movement of services. In so 
doing, the Court abstains from any effort to transpose, extrapolate or  explain 
how the rules on goods and services, and exceptions thereto, may work 
together. This is all the more striking because the Court did have a 
“precedent” to the same effect from the goods’ case-law to which it could 
refer: Kohl and the rest are all based on the judgment of the Court in 
Duphar¸203 which specifically concerned the sale of medicines.204 
The third characteristic of the Court’s case-law on justifications for the 
violation of the services provisions, consists of an ever increasing control of 
the necessity/proportionality of the contested national measures. The intensity 
of this control, however, is often tempered by the fact that the Court allows the 
final appreciation of the facts of each case to be carried out by the referring 
jurisdictions.205  
Gambelli is again a good illustration of the Court’s more stringent (?) 
approach to the requirements of necessity and proportionality. The Court 
reasons in three steps. First it recalls that national measures should fulfill the 
four Gebhard conditions,206 i.e. “they must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general 
interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it”.207 Second, the Luxembourg Court states that it is for the referring 
jurisdiction to ascertain whether these conditions are met in the case under 
examination. Third, the Court goes on to spend a paragraph or two on each of 
the four requirements, thus providing detailed guidance to the national Court. 
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In particular, the Court holds that the contested measures may only be 
suitable when they serve the objective pursued in “a consistent and 
systematic manner”; this cannot hold true where the Member State in 
question also adopts/maintains measures in the opposite sense. Further, the 
Court states that the requirement of nondiscrimination is not merely a formal 
one; it is a substantial one. Hence, it encourages the national Court “to 
consider whether the manner in which the conditions for submitting invitations 
to tender for licences to organise bets on sporting events are laid down 
enables them in practice to be met more easily by Italian operators than by 
foreign operators”.208 Finally, in relation to the requirement of proportionality, 
the Court stresses that it should be appreciated in view of the content of the 
legislation of both the home and host Member States. It is this same idea of 
“consistency” and of taking into account the whole of Member States’ 
legislation that explains the opposite outcome in Gräbner. Having accepted 
that Austria could lawfully ban the activity of Heilpraktiker on its territory under 
Article 46, the Court was also ready to accept that the prohibition of training 
courses for Heilpraktikers was “also lawful in order to permit that the [former] 
prohibition to be applied in a coherent and credible manner”.209 This case also 
offers an interesting illustration of the “birth” of a mandatory requirement: 
training courses for Heilpraktikers could not in themselves endanger public 
health, so their prohibition could not be justified under Article 46 EC. However, 
as a coherent accompanying measure to the prohibition of Heilpraktikers’ 
activities, this measure could correspond to a mandatory requirement. 
Finalarte offers yet another example of the detail in which the Court is willing 
to appreciate the necessity and proportionality of restrictive national 
measures. The German legislation provided for an employer’s contribution to 
a paid-leave fund for workers in the construction industry. The question arose 
as to whether Portuguese and UK companies who posted workers in 
Germany should also contribute in this scheme. The Court found that the host 
Member State could extend its restrictive legislation to posted workers, 
provided that “those rules confer a genuine benefit on the workers concerned, 
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which significantly adds to their social protection”.210 Again, it was for the 
national Court to verify whether this condition was met, according to the grid 
of analysis provided by the Luxembourg Court itself. Once more, the starting 
point should be the comparison between the home and host Member States’ 
legislation and the application of the mutual recognition principle. Then, “the 
national Court [should] check that, when they have returned to the Member 
State where their employer is established, the workers concerned are 
genuinely able to assert their entitlement to holiday pay from the fund, having 
regard, in particular, to the formalities to be observed, the language to be 
used and the procedure for payment.”211 Hence, again, it is the actual 
application of the law, not merely its letter, which matters. And the Court 
pushes its control even further, as it encourages the referring jurisdiction to 
ascertain whether other, less restrictive measures, such as for example, “a 
duty imposed on employers established outside Germany to pay directly to 
the worker, during the period of the posting, the holiday allowance to which he 
is entitled under the German rules” could better satisfy the test of 
proportionality.212  
3.2.2. Public service 
In the cases in which the free movement of services could be held to enter 
directly into conflict with the provision of some service of general economic 
interest, the Court gave clear prevalence to the latter over the former. In 
Deutsche Post the rule which allowed the incumbent monopolist to charge 
other (Member) States’ postal operators charges for bulk re-mails of items 
sent through them was challenged under Article 86 combined with 82 and 49 
EC. The Court held that Article 86(2) EC could justify exceptions to the Treaty 
rules, to the extent that such exceptions are indispensable for the pursuit of 
activities of general economic interest. In this respect the Court held that “[t]he 
postal services of a Member State cannot simultaneously bear the costs 
entailed in the performance of the service of general economic interest of 
forwarding and delivering international items of mail […], and the loss of 
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income resulting from the fact that bulk mailings are no longer posted with the 
postal services of the Member State in which the addressees are resident but 
with those of other Member States”.213 What is remarkable about this 
statement is the ease with which the Court reaches it. It is remembered that in 
Corbeau and Almelo the Court had developed the concept of “severability”, 
whereby profitable activities should remain subject to the Treaty rules, while 
non-profitable ones would evade them.214 This idea, however, was severely 
limited (if not altogether abandoned) in the judgment in Glöckner.215 In this 
case the question arose whether the organization of ambulance services 
should be subject to the competition rules and whether it was possible to 
distinguish between emergency services (not subject to the Treaty rules) and 
other ambulance services (subject to the competition rules). The Court held 
the two to be inseparable and altogether outside the scope of the competition 
rules, since monies generated by the latter services could enable the 
operators concerned to discharge their general-interest task in conditions of 
economic equilibrium. The readiness with which the Court accepted in 
Deutsche Post that the fees charged by the monopolist were necessary for 
the discharge of its general interest obligations, without examining in any 
detail the accuracy of such a statement, takes Tögel a step further, as it 
shows that the Court’s increasingly hands-off approach towards the financing 
of activities of general interest.  
However, if financing the services of general interest is increasingly left to the 
discretion of the States, the same is not true with other, administrative 
restrictions to their provision. Hence, in Analir 216 the Court did not approve of 
a prior authorization requirement imposed by the Spanish legislation on all 
operators wishing to offer “cabotage” services. The Court readily accepted 
that the objective of ensuring regular maritime transport services to, from and 
between the islands is a legitimate public interest. It was, nevertheless, much 
more skeptical about whether a prior authorization procedure which had a 
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214 Case C-320/91, Corbeau, [1993] ECR I-2562 and Case C-393/92, Almelo, [1994] ECR I-1477. See for 
these judgments Wachsmann and Berrod, “Les critères de justification des monopoles: un premier bilan 
après l'affaire Corbeau”, (1994) RTDE, 39. See also Baquero Cruz, “Beyond competition: services of 
general economic interest and EC law” in De Burca (Ed.), n. 64 above, pp. 169-212. 
215 Case C-475/99, Glöckner, [2001] ECR I-8089. 
 48
general scope (all destinations) and ill-defined award criteria (discretionary) 
was able to secure such an objective.217  
The combination of the above judgments produces a, by now, familiar 
outcome: the Court is ready to accept restrictive measures serving some 
legitimate interest (here: the pursuance of a service of general economic 
interest) where they merely make the provision of services more expensive, 
but maintains a firm stance against measures which impose additional 
administrative burdens.218  
 
4. Case studies  
As has become clear from the very introduction of the present article, during 
these last five years the Court has been actively involved in the liberalization 
of trade in services within the EU. This comes as no surprise in view of the 
oxymoron that, on the one hand services represent roughly 70% of Member 
States GDPs and employment, while on the other hand, cross-border trade in 
services among the Member States is still extremely restricted.219  Moreover, 
as is all too well known to every polish plumber and nurse – and to all other 
Europeans – the Commission’s initiative to regulate trade in services in a 
general and horizontal manner has had a quite perilous sort.  
The mass of cases decided by the Court during the last five years may be 
classified into eleven broad categories. These would include (in no particular 
order) a) restrictions to sports activities, mainly imposed by national or 
international federations,220 b) fiscal measures impeding the free provision of 
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services,221 c) residence, domiciliation, registration and authorization 
requirements,222 with a surprising number of similar restrictions concerning in 
particular the activity of private security firms,223 d) maritime, air and sea 
transport cases,224 e) advertising restrictions,225 f) financial services,226 g) 
gaming, h) posted workers, i) public procurement and concessions, j) 
healthcare and social security and k) miscellaneous cases.227  Due to a lack of 
space, only the gaming and posted workers cases shall be presented here, 
for, together with the healthcare and public procurement cases (presented 
above at 2.1.3.2. and 2.1.3.3, respectively), they constitute the most important 
substantial developments of the Court’s case law during the last five years. 
4.1 Gaming 
The position of the court in respect of gambling and gaming activities has 
been set, before the period under examination, through its judgments in cases 
Schindler, Zenatti and Läärä.228 In these judgments the court held gambling 
and gaming to constitute services within the meaning of article 49 EC and all 
national limitations to the pursuance of such activities to be contrary to the 
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abovementioned Treaty provision. However, the court was strikingly indulgent 
towards Member States, as it readily accepted justifications stemming from all 
sorts of overriding reasons of general interest, without inquiring into their 
proportionality or even, their discriminatorily nature.229  
More recently, with cases Anomar, Gambelli and Lindman the Court refined 
its position in relation to gaming.230  
In Anomar, the Portuguese legislation was challenged on the ground that only 
the undertakings incorporated in public limited companies could operate 
games of chance or gambling, subject to a prior authorization granted by the 
Government. The Portuguese provisions were regarded as restricting the 
freedom to provide services, although overriding reasons relating to the public 
interest were accepted. In line with Schindler and Läärä, the Court restricted 
itself to a very limited proportionality and left it to the national authorities to 
make the final determination as to whether the means are proportionate to the 
objectives protected.  
Gambelli belongs to the category of case law which has arisen as a result of 
problems specific to the “Internet era”.231 Criminal proceedings were initiated 
against Gambelli on the ground that he was collecting bets when, according to 
the Italian legislation, such activities were reserved to State authorized 
entities. The Italian legislation was found to constitute a restriction under 
Articles 43 and 49 EC read together.232 The ECJ then went on to jointly 
examine the imperative requirements in the general interest that could justify 
the measure, namely consumer protection or the prevention of fraud. 
Although it was for the national courts to determine whether national 
measures satisfy the proportionality test, the ECJ set out some quite detailed 
guidelines.233 Restrictions may be justified but “must also be suitable for 
achieving those objectives, inasmuch as they must serve to limit betting 
activities in a consistent and systematic manner”.234 In any case, national rules 
must be applied without discrimination. The limits of the Court’s tolerant 
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attitude to date are evident in the Gambelli case. In fact, the Italian authorities 
were shown to encourage and incite gaming addiction rather than to limit 
betting activities. Consequently, the concrete and real intention of the Member 
States is taken seriously into account since they can be tempted to disguise 
potentially protectionist operations under the cover of consumer concerns.  
In Lindman,235 the issue at stake was the Finnish taxation scheme on winnings 
of games of chance. Ms Lindman, a Finnish citizen, bought a winning lottery 
ticket during a stay in Sweden. Upon her return to Finland, .Ms Lindman was 
charged income tax whilst winnings from lotteries held in Finland were exempt 
from taxes. The ECJ had, for the first time, the opportunity to examine fiscal 
measures and the freedom to receive services in the field of lottery. 
Unsurprisingly, the ECJ stressed the need for direct taxation schemes, even if 
they fall outside the competences of the Community, to comply with 
Community law in general. Therefore, since foreign lotteries were treated 
differently than domestic ones, the Finnish taxation scheme infringed Article 
49 EC. However, the ECJ emphasized, once again, the role of the national 
courts in assessing the appropriateness and proportionality of the restrictive 
measure, in line with the previous judgments.  
These ECJ rulings have put an end to Member State hypocrisy and to its own 
tendency to close an eye to unfounded, artificial and even discriminatory – 
and in any event protectionist – justifications put forward by Member States.236 
The ECJ made plain that each time official prerogatives were exercised 
arbitrarily, justifications would not be allowed. On the flip side, when the 
measure genuinely sets out to reduce gambling addiction, the national 
authorities remain largely sovereign.  
A parallel between this case law and the recent Opinion of the WTO Appellate 
Body should be drawn.237 Antigua and Barbuda had brought a complaint under 
the GATS against the US measures which restricted the cross-border 
provision of gambling and betting services. The Appellate Body reversed the 
Panel’s report and found in favour of the US in so far as a) the measures were 
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justified on the ground of public morals and public order, that is to say (they 
intended to deter) problems of money laundering, compulsive gambling, fraud 
and underage gambling and b) they were respectful of the principle of 
necessity and non-discrimination. 
Hitherto, a tolerant position of the Court prevailed. However, the number of 
complaints seems to be growing incessantly. The Commission gave 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden the 
opportunity to submit their observations following the complaints raised by 
sports betting service providers.238 Therefore, it would be interesting to keep 
abreast of subsequent case law and above all, the attitude of the Court with 
regard to the protectionist behavior of the Member States. The more so, since 
gaming has been excluded from the scope of the Commission’s new draft 
“services” Directive - 239 a further indication of the relative immunity enjoyed by 
gaming restrictions.   
4.2. Posted workers  
During these last five years the court has handed down almost a dozen 
judgments concerning posted workers. These, as important as they may be, 
have constantly been under the spotlight, since they have (erroneously) been 
linked with the “services” Directive and the infamous “polish plumber”.  
The starting point in the Court’s case law concerning posted workers are 
cases Evi v Seco, Rush Portuguesa and Vander Elst.240 The first concerned a 
French undertaking using third country nationals in railway repairs in 
Luxembourg, the second a Portuguese undertaking deploying Portuguese 
nationals (at a time when they did not yet benefit from free movement) in 
railway construction in France and the third, a Belgian undertaking deploying 
Moroccan workers in construction (read: demolition) works in France. Read 
together, these three cases broadly settle the issue of posted workers, along 
with three key principles: a) a service provider may move from one Member 
State to another with his own personnel, irrespective of their nationality, 
without having to satisfy supplementary administrative requirements linked 
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either to immigration or to labour market regulations; b) a service provider 
may, nonetheless, be required to comply with the legislation (collective 
agreements, arbitral sentences etc.) of the host State concerning minimum 
remuneration and other working conditions and all national measures 
reasonably suited to enforcing /monitoring such a requirement are 
acceptable;241 c) a service provider may not be required to comply with all the 
social security obligations and linked formalities for workers who are already 
covered in his (home) State of establishment, unless such burdens actually 
add up to the protection of workers.  These basic principles, especially in 
relation to minimum pay, were later codified by Directive 96/71.242 The 
Directive also provided for the designation of one ore more “liaison offices” 
and for cooperation between the competent national authorities in order to 
facilitate the free provision of services.  
All three principles above were consequently confirmed in Arblade and 
Leloup.243 This case concerned two French undertakings which had been 
employing their own personnel (the nationality of which is not specified in the 
Court’s judgment) in Silo constructions in Belgium and had infringed 
regulations which, among other things, a) imposed a minimum pay, b) 
necessitated the drawing-up, keeping and retaining of social documents for 
each one of the workers employed and c) required the payment of 
supplementary social security contributions for each worker, in the form of 
“timbres intempéries” and “timbres-fidélité” . According to the principles 
above, the Court accepted a), but rejected b) and c). In relation to b), the 
Court noted that the French undertakings were already subject to similar 
obligations in their home State and held that “the mere fact that there are 
certain differences of form or content cannot justify the keeping of two sets of 
documents”.244 It further stated that as soon as Directive 96/71 would enter into 
force, the cooperation obligation imposed by its Article 4 would render 
superfluous many of the formal requirements imposed upon service providers. 
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Subsequently, in the period under consideration, a series of cases further 
refined – and to some limited extent reversed – the above case law, in all 
three respects.  
4.2.1. Administrative requirements 
Corsten and Schnitzer both concerned the same requirement of the German 
labour legislation, that skilled workers, in order to receive authorization for the 
exercise of their activities, should be entered into a national trade register, 
entailing compulsory membership of the Chamber of Skilled Trades and 
payment of the related subscription. This measure was deemed to guarantee 
the quality of skilled trade work and to protect those who have commissioned 
such work. The Court found that if an authorization procedure was to be 
imposed upon service providers, it should “neither delay nor complicate” nor 
render more onerous the provision of services.245 Further, in Schnitzer, which 
concerned construction works extending over a period of three years, the 
Court held that if an entry to the trades register were justified at all, such an 
entry “cannot be other than automatic, and that requirement cannot constitute 
a condition precedent for the provision of services”.246  
Hence in Commission v. Luxembourg247 the Court held that a requirement that 
service providers obtain individual work permits for all third country workers 
employed in Luxembourg, or a collective working permit delivered under 
exceptional circumstances, “involves formalities and periods which are liable 
to discourage the free provision of services through the medium of workers 
who are nationals of non-member countries.” Instead, the social welfare and 
the stability of the labour market could be pursued by an ex ante declaration. 
Building upon this finding, more recently in Commission v Germany,248 where 
the facts were almost identical, the Court confirmed that any technical 
requirement (such as one year’s previous employment by the same 
undertaking) conditioning the delivery of a work visa to third country posted 
workers would violate Article 49 EC and that a prior declaration should suffice. 
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Wolff & Müller249 concerned a different aspect of the German legislation which 
made construction undertakings liable to the personnel of any subcontractor 
they employed, jointly with such a subcontractor. This measure did have the 
effect of making the provision of services to German undertakings more 
complicated and, hence, could violate Article 49 EC. The Court stated, 
however, that “if entitlement to minimum rates of pay constitutes a feature of 
worker protection, the procedural arrangements ensuring observance of that 
right, such as the liability of the guarantor in the main proceedings, must 
likewise be regarded as being such as to ensure that protection”.250 
 
4.2.2. Minimum wages 
Mazzoleni concerned the question whether French security personnel 
occasionally deployed in Belgium should be receiving the host State’s 
minimum wages. The Court recalled its well established case law according to 
which service providers should abide by the minimum remuneration 
requirements applicable in the host State. It went on to state that “however, 
there may be circumstances in which the application of such rules would be 
neither necessary nor proportionate to the objective pursued”.251 In order for 
the national measure to satisfy these two conditions, the national authorities 
should verify a) necessity: “whether all the workers concerned enjoy an 
equivalent position overall in relation to remuneration, taxation and social 
security contributions in the host Member State and in the Member State of 
establishment”252 and b) proportionality: whether the “application of the host 
Member State's national rules on minimum wages to service providers 
established in a frontier region of a Member State other than the host Member 
State may result, first, in an additional, disproportionate administrative burden 
including, in certain cases, the calculation, hour-by-hour, of the appropriate 
remuneration for each employee according to whether he has, in the course 
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of his work, crossed the frontier of another Member State and, second, in the 
payment of different levels of wages to employees who are all attached to the 
same operational base and carry out identical work.”253 This is the first time 
that the Court held that national legislation in respect of minimum pay may not 
apply to a service provider. The Court’s judgment seemed confined to the 
facts, especially to the extent that it concerned an undertaking established in 
a frontier region.254  
Some months later however, in Portugaia Construcoes, a run of the mill 
posted workers case (no border areas or other distinguishing factor), the 
Court reiterated this statement. 255 A Portuguese construction company was 
being pursued for having paid its personnel, posted in Germany, lower wages 
than those provided for by the German collective agreement. The Court 
repeated that the full application of such a collective agreement could violate 
Article 49 EC, especially if it did not “significantly” augment the worker’s social 
protection. It is unclear what “significantly” means in this context, but it is even 
less clear why the Court considered it necessary to make these statements, 
since nothing in the facts of the case pointed towards there being an 
unjustified violation of the free provision of services.256 In this regard, this case 
confirms that minimum wages are not automatically and necessarily 
applicable to posted workers. 
4.2.3. Social security and other charges 
In Finalarte the question was whether employers established in Portugal and 
the UK, who had their personnel working in Germany, should participate in a 
paid-leave scheme, designed to protect workers who were frequently 
changing employers. As explained above (at 3.2.1.) the Court stated that for 
the restrictive measure to be justified it had to confer a real and genuine 
benefit on workers, assessed in view of the actual difficulties with which they 
would be faced when trying to assert the above benefit, once they would 
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return to their home States. Then the Court went even further and stated that 
even if the rules were shown to actually benefit workers, they would still be 
subject to a test of proportionality, since “the national court should balance 
the administrative and economic burdens that the rules impose on providers 
of services against the increased social protection that they confer on workers 
compared with that guaranteed by the law of the Member State where their 
employer is established”.257 Hence, measures which benefit workers are no 
more immune as such, but only subject to the above qualification. This clearly 
opens up a gap in the protection of workers, since it has to be weighed 
against the economic freedom of their employers.  
The above findings are based on the presumption that the posted workers 
continue to be subject to the social security rules of the home State of the 
service provider. This, however, is not always the case. In fact this should 
only be the exception. According to Article 13(2) of Regulation 1408/71 
workers should be registered with the social security institutions of the place 
of their work, irrespective of the place of their residence or the seat of their 
employer. Article 14(1), however, introduces an exception to the above rules if 
“the anticipated duration of that work [in the host Member State] does not 
exceed 12 months”. In this case workers are covered in the host State by 
virtue of Forms E 101 (pensions) and E 111 (healthcare) delivered by their 
home State authorities. In Plum the Court held that an undertaking which had 
a simple office in the Netherlands but regularly and constantly deployed its 
personnel in Germany (for repetitive periods of less than 12 months), could 
not invoke the exception of Article 14(1) and should have its workers insured 
with the host State institutions.258 In Fitzwilliam,259 on the other hand, which 
concerned an Irish agency for the temporary placement of workers, the Court 
held that E 101 Certificates delivered by the authorities of the Member State 
where such undertaking has its seat, may not be set aside by other member 
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States’ authorities claiming that workers should be affiliated to them.260 It is 
however, for the home State authorities to reconsider the grounds of issue of 
a Certificate and, if necessary, withdraw it, by taking into account a series of 
criteria. These include “the place where the undertaking has its seat and 
administration, the number of administrative staff working in the Member State 
in which it is established and in the other Member State, the place where 
posted workers are recruited and the place where the majority of contracts 
with clients are concluded, the law applicable to the employment contracts 
concluded by the undertaking with its workers, on the one hand, and with its 
clients, on the other hand, and the turnover during an appropriately typical 
period in each Member State concerned”.261 And the list is only indicative… 
Fitzwilliam was largely confirmed recently in Rijksdienst voor Sociale 
Zekereheid.262 
The above case law may be summed up as follows: the Court pushes forward 
the posting of workers in all three respects; administrative requirements, pay, 
social security. However, in respect of the final two issues the Court’s case 
law has significantly departed from its starting point, i.e. the idea that the host 
State may fully impose its own conditions to workers posted in its territory. In 
all respects the Court has opened inroads to the full and automatic application 
of the host State’s legislation. Therefore, fears of social dumping, nurtured by 
politicians and the media, are not completely unfounded. They are, however, 
completely unrelated to the draft “services” directive, as they stem directly 
from Article 49 EC, as interpreted by the Court. The draft Directive, for its part, 
in an all-encompassing and horizontal approach based on minimal 
harmonization did, in its initial version, put into work the country of origin (or 
home State) principle. Nonetheless, exemptions and safeguards were 
expressly established and the proposal was plainly in line with the 
abovementioned (mainstream) case law. On the one hand, the Member State 
of posting could not impose on the provider established in another Member 
                                                          
260 For the idea that the host State’s authorities may not hold invalid or else ignore certificates delivered by the 
home State authorities, see IKA v. Ioannidis, for Form E 111 (2.1.3.3. above) and Kapper, for a driving 
licence (5.1.2. below). 
261 Fitzwilliam, n. 262 above, para 43. 
262 Case C-2/05, Rijksdienst voor Sociale Zekereheid v. Herbosch Kiere NV, judgment of 26 January 2006, 
nyr. 
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State any additional burden such as an authorization, a declaration, an 
obligation to have a representative on its territory or a requirement to keep 
specific social documents.263 On the other hand, the application of Directive 
96/71 (on minimum pay and working conditions) was enhanced through a 
stronger mechanism of cooperation and specific provisions in relation to the 
posting of EU workers and non-EU workers were laid down, in conformity with 
the Court’s rulings.264 Thus, the principle of the country of origin was not 
applied to posted workers. However, public opinion, not fully aware of the 
precise content of the text, heavily objected to the project.265 While the 
Commission’s intention was to rationalize the Court’s case law in order to 
preempt a cascade of preliminary questions, the initiative received a very 
mixed response. By replacing the country of origin principle with the general 
principle of freedom to provide services, the added-value of the initial proposal 
has been set at nought. Although the initial version would not have altered the 
acquis, the deletion of the posted workers provisions leads to further legal 
uncertainty.  
In this respect two cases currently pending before the Court are of extreme 
interest. The first one was brought by Laval, a Latvian construction 
company.266 Swedish trade unions, exercising their right to strike, were 
blocking the access to a construction site because of Laval’s refusal to sign 
the Swedish collective agreement on wages and working conditions. Thus, 
the question of the compatibility of industrial action as a means to secure 
minimum wages with Article 49 EC arose. In the second case, Viking, a 
Finnish shipping company,267 was faced with the loss-making of its ship 
Rosella routing between Helsinki and Tallinn. The company, alleging that 
competition had been distorted by cheaper Estonian vessels, decided to 
                                                          
263 Services Directive, Arts. 16 and 20.  
264 Services Directive, Arts. 24 and 25. These provisions were deleted in the final proposal. 
265 See the Communication of the Commission - Guidance on the posting of workers in the framework of 
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reflag its own vessel in order to employ an Estonian crew. The Finnish trade 
unions, competent to negotiate collective agreements with ship-owners owing 
vessels in Finland, contested such a decision by going on strike. Viking 
alleged a breach of the freedom to provide services under Regulation 4055/86 
on maritime transports. Once more, the ECJ will have to answer whether the 
provisions on services are applicable to trade unions and to collective actions. 
The Court will have to strike a fine balance between the Treaty economic 
freedoms, the protection of workers and the respect of fundamental social 
rights. Social dumping will certainly be in the legal and political agenda of the 
EU for some time to come. 
 
5. General principles derived from a horizontal analysis 
5.1  From mutual recognition to “home state control” and beyond? 
The principle of mutual recognition occupies an ever increasing role in the 
Court’s case law in relation to services. Through a series of judgments, the 
Court transforms this functional general principle of EC law,268 into two more 
specific but far-fetched principles, for the furtherance of which the legislature’s 
intervention should be necessary. First the Court pushes mutual recognition 
towards some kind of “home state” control (5.1.1) which, in turn, makes some 
enhanced cooperation necessary between Member States’ authorities (5.1.2). 
5.1.1 Towards a general application of an imperfect “home state” 
principle? 
In a field covered by “passport” Directives, such as the third non-life and life 
insurance Directives,269 the application of the home state principle would 
hardly come as a surprise. It is recalled that the basic architecture of the 
passport Directives lies on the distinction between, on the one hand 
authorization, which is fully based on the home state principle, and, on the 
other hand, supervision, which remains essentially the task of the host states’ 
                                                          
268 See Hatzopoulos, Le principe communautaire d’équivalence et de reconnaissance mutuelle dans la libre 
prestation de services,  Sakkoulas/Bruylant (1999), pp. 73-100. For a different account see “Mutual 
Recognition” in Barnard and Scott (Eds.), The Law of the Single European Market, Unpacking the 
Premisses, Hart (Oxford, 2002), pp. 225-267. 
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authorities.270 In Commission v France, insurance,271 however, the distinction 
between the two was blurred, to the benefit of foreign undertakings.  The 
French authorities acting within their supervision tasks, required foreign 
insurance and capitalization undertakings to notify “information sheets” 
concerning the basic terms of the standard insurance contracts they offered 
within the French territory. According to the French government such a 
notification was necessary for the exercise of supervision by means of post 
hoc sampling, in compliance with the above Directives. The Court held that 
such a request for information could not be systematic, to the extent that the 
French authorities possessed, under the Directives, the basic information 
concerning the undertakings and were, therefore, allowed to obtain additional 
information only by way of occasional post hoc sampling.272 Hence, in this 
case the home state principle which covers, in theory, the authorization of 
insurance undertakings, can also impinge upon the way in which supervision 
may be carried out. 
On many other occasions the legislation of Member States has been 
condemned for failing to take into account conditions fulfilled or guarantees 
offered by a service provider in his home State. Hence, in Commission v. 
Italy, transport consultants 273 the Italian legislation required transport 
consultants, among other things, to be resident in Italy and to have a security 
lodged with the provincial administration. While the former requirement was 
struck down as directly negating the freedom to provide services, the latter 
was also found to be illegal to the extent that it made it “impossible for 
account to be taken of obligations to which the person providing the service is 
already subject in the Member State in which he is established”.274 The very 
same requirements were also struck down by the Court for exactly the same 
                                                          
270 Further on the architecture and the application of the passport directives see Hatzopoulos, n. 271 above, 
414 et seq. 
271 Commission v. France, Insurance, n. 228 above. Note, however, that the requirement that all car insurance 
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272 Id., paras 31 and 32. 
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reasons in relation to the activities of temporary labor agencies operating in 
Italy, in Commission v. Italy, temporary labour agencies. 
 Similarly, in Commission v Italy, sanitation services275 a registration 
requirement enforced by strict penalties was held to violate Article 49 EC to 
the extent that it did “not exclude from its scope a provider of services who is 
established in a Member State other than the Italian Republic and who, under 
the legislation of its Member State of establishment, already satisfies formal 
requirements equivalent to those under the Italian Law”.276 Although this 
judgment predates the two mentioned above, it is more earth-shattering,  
insofar as it does not concern a mere financial guarantee, but the very 
authorization itself delivered by the host State authorities.  
In Commission v. The Netherlands, private security firms277 the Court went 
much further, both in applying some kind of the home state principle and in 
explaining how this ties in with the Court’s judicial reasoning. Two 
requirements of the Dutch legislation concerning security and detective 
activities were contested by the Commission and both were found in breach of 
Article 49 EC. The first rule required undertakings and their managers to 
obtain prior authorization for their activities by the Dutch authorities. In this 
respect the Court noted that “by excluding consideration of the obligations to 
which the trans-frontier service provider is already subject in the Member 
State in which it is established, [the contested measure]  goes in any event 
beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives sought, namely to ensure 
close supervision of those activities”.278 The second rule required the 
personnel of such undertakings to carry special ID cards delivered by the 
Dutch authorities. This requirement, too, was found to go beyond what was 
necessary in order to certify the competence and professional integrity of the 
individuals concerned “in so far as it [did] not take account of the controls or 
verifications already carried out in the Member State of origin”.279 The Court 
further held that the identity of the individuals concerned could be proven by 
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the valid passport or ID card delivered by their home state authorities. It must 
be stressed that this judgment is just one, albeit the most concise and clear, 
of a series of infringement cases decided by the Court upon quasi-identical 
facts.280 Therefore, these judgments stand, first, for the idea that all controls 
and checks carried out by the home state should be taken into account by the 
authorities of the host State, irrespective of whether they refer to purely formal 
guarantees, such as the deposit of some financial security, or to substantial 
qualifications, such as the competence and integrity of service providers. 
What is more, this obligation of the host state authorities covers not only 
checks that have been made by the home state in view of the exercise of the 
specific service activity, but also of those aimed at different purposes (such as 
the issuance of the passports in the Dutch case). Second, these judgments 
stand for the idea that the application of some variety of the home state 
principle comes as an integral component of the proportionality test of national 
measures. Hence, although the Court is not in a position to implement a fully 
fledged “home country” principle whereby the host state authorities would be 
devoid of any competence over service providers from other Member States, 
it does nonetheless introduce such a principle through the back door, by way 
of the strengthened control of the proportionality of national measures. 
The full effect of the above findings may be illustrated by the judgment in yet 
another private insurance case brought before the Court, by means of a 
preliminary ruling. The question referred to the Court in Mazzoleni was 
whether a French employer of security personnel occasionally posted in 
Belgium should be obliged to comply with Belgian legislation concerning the 
minimum wage of private security agents. The Court recalled its previous 
case law according to which such legislation would, in principle, be justified by 
the objective of protecting workers. However, the host State’s legislation could 
be set aside if it were not necessary and proportionate to the objective of 
workers’ protection (see above 4.2.2.). The fact that, in the name of 
proportionality, the Court is ready to set aside the sacrosanct principle of the 
host State’s regulations securing the protection (and equal treatment) of 
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workers, is indicative of the weight the Court is putting on home State control 
as a means for the liberalization of services within the EU. 
5.1.2. Duty of cooperation between national authorities 
A corollary to the above imperfect home state principle and a technical 
condition for its application is the duty of Member States’ authorities to 
cooperate with one another. Such cooperation may take two forms. First, it 
may require the authorities of the host state to fully take into account and/or 
make full use of all the information, documents, certification etc provided by 
the home state authorities’. Second, it may demand that the authorities of the 
Member States concerned work together, in order to actively promote the 
pursuance of the Treaty fundamental freedoms.  
The first species of cooperation duty is to be found in all the cases concerning 
prior authorization, notification, the deposit of some form of guarantee or the 
issuance of duplicate (host) identification documents, discussed above.281 It 
constitutes a typical application of the principle of mutual recognition.  
The latter form, whereby national authorities are required to fully cooperate 
with each other is much more ground-breaking. This is a delicate path to 
venture upon and the Court has displayed both caution and firmness. In a first 
series of cases the Court has built upon the specific cooperation obligations 
imposed by texts of secondary legislation. Hence, in IKA v Ioannidis,282 a 
healthcare service case, where the right of a Greek pensioner to claim a 
refund from his fund for treatment received in Germany under the terms of 
Regulation 1408/71 283 was at stake, the Court held that “[t]he institutions of 
the place of stay and the place of residence jointly assume the task of 
applying Articles […] of Regulation No 1408/71 and […] must, in accordance 
with Article 10 EC and Article 84 of Regulation No 1408/71, cooperate in order 
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to ensure that those provisions are applied correctly and, consequently, that 
the rights conferred on pensioners and members of their families […] with a 
view to facilitating the freedom of movement of those insured persons are fully 
respected”.284 
In Kapper,285 a case where the German authorities were contesting the validity 
of a driving license delivered by the Dutch, the Court found a violation of 
Directive 92/439/EC286 and of Articles 39, 43 and 49 EC. The Court held that 
“where a host Member State has good reason to doubt the validity of one or 
more licenses issued by another Member State, it must so inform the latter 
under the rules relating to mutual assistance and the exchange of information 
contained in Article 12(3) of that Directive. Should the Member State which 
issued the license fail to take the appropriate measures, the host Member 
State may bring proceedings against the first State under Article 227 EC for a 
declaration by the Court that there has been a failure to comply with the 
obligations arising under Directive 91/439”.287 Hence, not only did the Court 
completely rule out the possibility that a license issued by the authorities of 
one member be invalidated by those of another Member State,288 but it also 
recognized the possibility of initiating infringement proceedings against states, 
the authorities of which fail to cooperate effectively. Further, from the 
judgment of the Court in Ioannidis v IKA, it stems that the duty of cooperation 
is also founded on Article 10 EC.  
A step further was taken in Danner,289 where the Court rejected the Danish 
governments’ argument that the effectiveness of fiscal controls justified the 
fact that pensions paid to residents by foreign funds did not qualify for a 
deduction from taxable income. The Court held that the exchange of 
information instituted by Directive 77/799 290 provided an efficient tool ensuring 
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the efficacy of fiscal controls. “In addition, there [was] nothing to prevent the 
tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer to provide such proof as 
they may consider necessary in order to determine whether the conditions for 
deducting contributions provided for in the legislation at issue have been met 
and, consequently, whether to allow the deduction requested.”291 Therefore, 
the Court states, that even where the secondary legislation in place does not 
effectively meet the legitimate objectives pursued by the host State’s 
authorities, the latter is required to look into and to accept further evidence 
provided by the interested party, before imposing a restrictive measure. 
Such an obligation may also be imposed upon Member States’ authorities 
even in the absence of any specific text of secondary legislation. In Oulane 
the Court held that the requirement that all Member States’ nationals should 
posses a valid passport or ID card while in another Member State, “was 
aimed, first, at simplifying the resolution of problems relating to evidence”,292 
but could not be imposed in an absolute way, if the person concerned were 
able to provide unequivocal proof of his nationality by other means. This 
implies that the authorities in question may not rely only on the official 
documents they are familiar with, but may further be required to adduce 
evidence, concerning the person’s identity, by other means, probably in 
collaboration with the authorities of the Member State of origin of the person 
concerned. Further, in Commission v France, medical laboratories the Court 
held that a requirement that medical laboratories have a place of business in 
France in order to qualify under the national refund scheme, could not be 
upheld on grounds of public health. However, the Court was ready to accept 
that laboratories established in other Member States could be subject to an 
authorization procedure by the French authorities, according to the French 
rules. The Court further held that “[e]ven though the competent French 
authorities cannot be expected to carry out on-the-spot checks in other 
Member States, particularly inspections designed to ensure compliance with 
the operating conditions by the laboratories, it is nevertheless possible to 
require laboratories established in another Member State to prove to the 
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satisfaction of the French authorities that the controls carried out by the 
competent authorities of the Member State in which they have their place of 
business are no less strict than those applicable in France and monitor 
compliance with provisions which safeguard at least the same level of health 
protection as the French rules”.293 Therefore, the French authorities should 
fully take into account both the rules applicable and the actual administrative 
practice of the supervisory authorities of the home state authorities.  
Through these cases it may be said that the Court, within the material limits of 
its capacity as an actor of negative integration, is in some indirect and 
imperfect way, trying to foster positive cooperation obligations to the 
authorities of Member States. This does not (and may not) go as far as a 
proper “home state control”, since the home State authorities maintain the last 
word on the operation of foreign service providers in their territory. In this 
respect the original draft of the “services Directive” would have had some 
important added value. It is to be remembered that under article 16 of the 
initial proposal, termed “Home Country Control”, not only the authorization, 
but also the supervision of service providers would lie with the home State 
authorities. It would be technically impossible and politically undesirable for 
the Court to substitute the will of the legislature and to impose a fully fledged 
home State control. What the Court does, however, is that it stresses the 
cooperation duty between the Member States’ authorities, in order to ensure 
an enhanced application of the principal of mutual recognition. Indeed, the 
mutual recognition and cooperation obligations imposed by the Court, seem to 
be going far further than the ones imposed by the watered down version of 
the draft “services” Directive. In this regard, the Directive is to be seen as a 
drawback from the Court’s case-law, both in respect of the fields covered 
(since Article 17 of the Directive provides for a lengthy list of exceptions, while 
the Court has expressly ruled that the general principles of Article 49 EC also 
apply in regulated fields)294 and in respect of to the intensity of the substantial 
obligations imposed upon the Member States.295 This, in turn, is set to trigger 
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afresh “Schussel-like reactions”, or the question of (or quest for) legitimacy.296 
This may be termed in two ways, depending on the eyes of the beholder. 
Politicians may ask whether the Court should interpret the Treaty in a way that 
is not in conformity with the will of the legislator. Lawyers, on the other hand, 
may enquire on whether the Council and Parliament should be allowed to 
legislate against the terms of the Treaty, as interpreted by the ECJ… 
5.2. Human rights 
Human rights are increasingly given a central role in the Court’s recent case-
law, and the field in which this is most apparent is services. Human rights may 
serve both as a sword and as a shield to the application of the free provision 
of services. In the latter category we have a judgment of principle, while in the 
former the Court’s case law is much more obscure and uncertain. 
5.2.1. Human rights as a shield to the free movement of services 
Omega is undisputedly delivered as a judgment of principle.297 The German 
prohibition of a “play to kill” game carried out in laserdomes was tested under 
Article 49 EC.298  The German prohibition was aimed at protecting human 
dignity, a value given constitutional status under German law. The Court 
acknowledged that the prohibition could amount to a restriction to the free 
provision of (leasing) services. It went on, however, to state that the protection 
of human dignity constitutes a fundamental right (although rarely mentioned 
as such in national or international statutes) and that as such it should be 
given prevalence over the fundamental Treaty freedoms. The formula used by 
the Court is void of any ambiguity: “[s]ince both the Community and its 
Member States are required to respect fundamental rights, the protection of 
those rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of 
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the obligations imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental 
freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as the freedom to provide services”.299  
This is not the appropriate place to comment on this landmark judgment.300 It 
is, nonetheless, worth underlining four elements: a) all human rights, even 
those which do not seem directly enforceable (such as human dignity), are to 
be respected, b) Member States may be authorized (also required?)301 to take 
positive action in order to ensure the respect of such rights, not merely 
abstain from actions which could violate them (as was already accepted in 
Schmidberger, where the Court held that the Austrian authorities were 
justified not to outlaw a demonstration which blocked the free movement of 
goods, as it stood for the fundamental right of expression),302 c) human rights 
are likely to come within the “public policy” exception expressly provided for 
by the Treaty, not any “mandatory requirement”, thus being able to justify both 
discriminatory and non discriminatory measures and d) the content of public 
policy and, hence, protected human rights may not be identical for all Member 
States, but may vary in accordance with moral, societal and other elements.  
This judgment should be read as the ECJ’s input in an ongoing dialogue with 
the Strasbourg European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in which the latter 
Court replied some months later, in Bosphorus International.303 In this 
judgment the ECtHR stated that it will not meddle with the way that the Treaty 
freedoms are applied, inasmuch as fundamental rights are effectively 
protected by the ECJ. In this respect Omega is a cornerstone judgment for the 
development of coherent case law between the two European jurisdictions 
and convergence between the two legal orders, established by the EU and 
the Council of Europe. This, irrespective of the final outcome of the EU 
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Constitutional Treaty which officially provides for the accession of the EU in 
the European Convention of Human Rights. 
5.2.2. Human rights as a sword for the free movement of services 
Much more debatable are the cases in which the Court uses human rights in 
order to stretch the scope of EU law and, indeed, its own competence. The 
judgment of the Court in Carpenter has aroused quite some excitement, not to 
mention criticism.304. The Court held that Mr. Carpenter was a service provider 
in the Article 49 EC sense of the term, since numerous recipients of his 
(advertisement etc) services were established in other Member States.305 
However the Court did not find that the UK expulsion measure, against Mr. 
Carpenter’s wife, directly violated his right to provide cross-border services. 
What the Court did was to “invent” a right to the protection of family life as 
being embedded within the “free movement” Directives, and also being 
protected by Article 8 of the ECHR. Then the Court found the UK measure to 
constitute a disproportionate restriction to this right (not to the free provision of 
services) and, hence held Article 49 EC to be violated (!). In other words, the 
Court brought together two strings of reasoning which bare no apparent and 
clear link between one another: Article 49 EC was not violated on its own 
account, but only became so because a fundamental human right was not 
respected…306 The reasoning of the Court is hardly convincing: “It is clear that 
the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be detrimental to their family 
life [Art. 8 ECHR] and, therefore [?], to the conditions under which Mr 
Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom [Art. 49 EC]”.307 
A couple of years later the Court adopted an even more elliptic reasoning, in a 
judgment which may at least be qualified as surprising. Karner concerned the 
Austrian prohibition that goods offered on sale be advertised as being the 
result of an insolvency procedure. This prohibition was tested under both the 
rules on goods and on services, since it made the sale (Article 28) and 
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advertising (Article 49) of goods from liquidations held in other Member States 
more difficult . The Court held Article 28 EC not to apply since the prohibition 
concerned a “selling arrangement” in the Keck & Mithouard sense. Article 49 
EC was also found to be inapplicable, since advertising in this case was 
merely “a secondary element to the sale of goods in question”. The Court then 
examined the argument put forward by the parties, according to which the 
contested prohibition constituted a violation of the fundamental right of 
expression, enshrined in Article 10 ECHR. In this respect the Court recalled 
that “where national legislation falls within the field of application of 
Community law the Court, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, must give the 
national Court all the guidance as to interpretation necessary to enable it to 
assess the compatibility of that legislation with the fundamental rights whose 
observance the Court ensures”.308 It then went on to find that if it were a 
restriction to the said freedom, it was nonetheless “reasonable and 
proportionate in the light of the legitimate goals pursued by that provision, 
namely consumer protection and fair trading”.309 What is lacking from the 
Court’s reasoning is any explanation as to why the national measure did 
indeed fall within the field of application of Community law. The Court states 
that the rules on goods and on services are both inapplicable, but fails to hold 
any other rules applicable in the case under examination. And despite that, it 
goes on to judge the compatibility of the measure with Article 10 of the ECHR! 
What is even more remarkable is that the Court finally upholds the contested 
measure, so one may wonder why it went to the pains of examining its 
compatibility with the ECHR at all. 
Three explanations may readily be put forward for this overall perplexing 
judgment. First, it may be said that EU law contains a general principle of free 
movement, applicable even where no particular Treaty provision is directly at 
stake. In other words, it may be said that the fundamental economic freedoms 
give rise to some constitutional value, covering all economic transactions 
                                                          
308 Karner, n. 135 above, para 49, emphasis added. 
309 Id., para 52. In so doing the Court referred both to its own and to the ECtHR’s case law. 
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presenting a trans-border element, which should always be preserved.310 Such 
a value would play, in the field of goods and services, the role played by 
European citizenship, in the field of persons. Second, it may be said that the 
protection of fundamental human rights is henceforth plainly a community 
competence. Such a view, very difficult to defend in view of the current 
position of the Treaties and the way the Institutions work, would have 
particularly far-reaching consequences and would radically modify the nature 
of the EU legal order. Third, this case may be authority for the simple idea that 
the Court will be paying increasing attention to the protection of human rights 
whenever argued in front of it, irrespective of whether they are promoted (as  
was the case in Omega) or restricted (as was arguably the case in Carpenter 
and Karner) by Member States. This may be explained by the idea that, with 
the gradual development of EU rules that govern virtually all aspects of the 
everyday lives of EU citizens, a coherent case law on the protection of 
fundamental rights is indispensable. Many more explanations could be 
advanced, as the judgment of the Court in Karner offers more of an opening 
for further developments of the Court’s case law in relation to human rights, 
rather than a solution proper.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
A total of 140 service cases are not easy to be accounted for in a single 
conclusion. However, the above bulk of cases calls for four final thoughts.  
First, although the scope of the freedom to provide services is constantly 
being expanded through the use of an ill-defined, accordion-like concept of 
remuneration, the circumstances under which Article 49 EC is violated are 
being rationalized. It is clear that non discriminatory national measures are 
caught. There is, nonetheless, an increasingly consistent distinction between, 
on the one hand, measures which merely make service provision more 
                                                          
310 About the constitutionalisation of the fundamental freedoms see, among many, Baquero Cruz, Between 
Competition and Free Movement, The Economic Constitutional Law of the EC, Hart Publishing (Oxford, 
2002), where all the relevant literature is extensively discussed. 
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expensive, which are allowed and, on the other hand, measures which create 
some administrative burden proper, which are prohibited, subject to 
justifications. This distinction was expressly spelled out in Mobistar.311 It is also 
present in the field of measures related to the provision of services of general 
economic interest, where the Court turns a blind eye to restrictions aimed at 
financing such services, while it keeps a strong grip over other administrative 
burdens.312 Similarly, in the posted workers saga the Court has consistently 
struck down restrictive administrative measures imposed on service providers, 
while it has only incrementally touched upon the question of pay.313 
Second, the convergence in the way the Internal Market freedoms apply, and 
between Internal Market and competition rules, already observed by highly 
qualified commentators,314 is being confirmed in many respects. Paragraphs 
2.3.4. and 3.1, as well, the text corresponding to footnotes 137, 144, 160, 177 
and 200 offer telling illustrations of cross-fertilization. These suggest that 
increasingly the Treaty rules will be applied in a consistent, comparable and 
even similar way, while the textual differences in the Treaty will allow the 
accommodation of specific facts of each case. From the point of view of the 
practitioner, the convergence already attained means that precedents in one 
field of law may serve as arguments in the others. 
Third, the brief presentation of the case law concerning healthcare services 
(2.1.3.3.) posted workers (4.2.) and the extensive application of the principle 
of mutual recognition (5.1.) shows that the initial draft of the “services” 
directive may have been the victim of populism, ignorance and fear, and not 
of its actual content.315 Further, it shows that the Court’s case law on services 
may have already gone too far towards liberalization, further than EU citizens 
are ready to endorse. This, in turn, begs the perpetual question of legitimacy 
and institutional balance within the EU. 
                                                          
311 See 3.1. above. 
312 See 3.2.2. above. 
313 See 4.2. above. 
314 For the Internal Market rules see n. 146 above; for the convergence between Internal Market and 
competition see n. 161 above. 
315 This, in turn, shows how difficult it is to communicate to the lay people, i.e. the citizens of the EU, the 
precise content of EU legislation – a problem which may not only be attributed to the people… 
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Fourth, the above finding seems to be confirming the fears of those who claim 
that, as long as the EU lacks clear competence in the social field and the 
Court is constrained to give judgments based on the economic provisions of 
the Treaty, it will necessarily push through the liberal agenda at the expense 
of the protection of social rights.316 This fear, however, should not be 
exaggerated, to the extent that the Court is paying an ever increasing 
attention to the protection of fundamental rights (5.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
316 See among many Poiares Maduro, “Europe’s social self: the sickness unto death”, Constitutionalism 
Web-Papers (2000), available at http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb/. 
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